On What Can Be Beautiful

Aristotle, in Poetics, says, "the beautiful is in both the magnitude and the arrangement. Wherefore neither the very small should become a beautiful animal (for since the vision [of it] occurs in a nearly unfelt extent of time it is confused) nor should the very large (for the vision [of it] does not happen all at the same time, but the single and whole thing is gone from the vision of those who see it, if, for example, the animal should be a thousand stades long)" (1450b35ff, Thorgerson trans.).

In Plato's Timaeus, Timaeus says that the cosmos is beautiful: it is the "most beautiful of things born" (29a); the god "joined together the all so that he had fashioned a work that would be most beautiful and best in accordance with nature" (30b); and "the god wanted to make it as similar as possible to the most beautiful of things grasped by the intellect" (30d-31a).

Now I take it that the cosmos counts as a very large object. So is Aristotle disagreeing with Plato/Timaeus on this matter?

But there's more. Timaeus says that the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) are "preeminent in beauty" (53e). Naturally, these elements are very, very small (though not the smallest of things). So now Plato/Timaeus seems to also be disagreeing with Aristotle about the possibility that small things can be beautiful.

I'll look in Aristotle's De Caelo to see if he makes similar comments about the universe.

But now I wonder who's right? We might say that pace Aristotle, microorganisms are beautiful. But our saying this depends upon looking at them through a microscope, by which a larger image of the organism appears to us. So is the microorganism beautiful, or just its larger image?

Similarly for the universe. We often say that the universe is beautiful. But don't we just mean that an image (usually a picture) of some region of the universe is beautiful?

Plato's way out: Defend the position that what is most beautiful is not visible.

Poetics 1450a

And it is an imitation of action, and especially because of this, of the men acting.

Third, the “thought”.

And this is the ability to say suitable and appropriate things, which indeed, in the case of words [1], is the work of the politician and rhetorician. For the ancients crafted people [2] who spoke politically and moderns, rhetorically. And “character” [3] is the sort of thing which clarifies choice, the sort [of choice] in which a person is not clear whether he choose or flee; wherefore those speeches do not have “character” in which there is nothing at all which the speaker chooses or flees. But “thought” is in those [speeches] that declare how something is or is not, or what it is generally considered [to be].

And fourth, of the things under “language”, is diction. As was said previously, I mean “diction” to be expression through language which, in the case of meter and the case of prose, has the same capability.

And of the remaining matters, song craft is the greatest of the ornamentations[4]; but the persuasive visual element is most unskillful and the least natural to the poetic craft, for tragedy is powerful even without the assembly and the actors, and moreover the skill of the fabricator (or 'costumier') is more authoritative as regards creating of the visuals than the skill of the poetic-crafters.[5]

7. These things having been defined then, after these matters, let us say what sort of arrangement is necessary for the arrangement of the actions, since this is the first and most important element of tragedy.

And it was laid down by us that tragedy is an imitation of a whole and complete action possessing some magnitude; for something is whole and has not magnitude.

And, something whole possesses a beginning, middle and end: and the beginning is that which is not by necessity after something else, after this some other thing comes to be or to become; and the end is that other sort of thing which comes to be after something else either by necessity or as in the majority [of the time], and after this there is nothing else; and the middle is that thing which is after another thing and after it [there are] other things.

It is necessary for the stories to be well arranged, neither happening to begin from wherever nor chancing to end at whatever point, but to express the forms that have been discussed.

Moreover since the beautiful—in respect to both an animal and whatever sort of deed which came together from some [causes]—it is not only necessary to have the arranged things [6], but also the magnanimity possessed not by chance occurance; for the beautiful is in both the magnanimity and the arrangement. Wherefor neither the very small should become a beautiful animal (for since the vision [of it] occurs in a nearly unfelt extent of time it is confused) nor should the very large (for the vision [of it] does not happen all at the same time, but the single and whole thing is gone from the vision of those who see it[7] if for example the animal should be a thousand stades long).

[1] epi (LSJ, A.I.2.f: “in the case of” or A.III.4: “in respect of,” “concerning”) twn logwn
[2] I think this means people in the plays – ie., the “doing” or “acting” men of the first sentence. [3] The LSJ definition of “ηθος” for Aristotle is dramatis persona, so “character” in the sense of drama.
[4] One translation says “enrichments”. The root of the word is the idea of sweetening something.
[5] Ar. is making a negative rhetorical argument: the costumier (for instance) has more say over the visual elements of the play than does the writer of the tragedy, so how can something that our hero, the guy who “synthesizes the plot elements,” has no control over be an essential part of tragedy?
[6] I understand this to mean, essentially, “fate” or “destiny” which Ar. validates in the next phrase—he is contrasting the things that must necessarily happen to someone, and the things that they make happen by their “magnamity” in action.
[7] Making use of the possessive dative; not sure this is correct.

Poetics 1450a

For by story I mean this: the synthesis (putting-together) of the actions; and by characters I mean that according to which we say the ones acting are of a certain sort, and by thought I mean that in which, while speaking, they demonstrate something or declare their opinion. Necessarily, therefore, there are six parts of all tragedy, according to which tragedy is of a certain sort. And these are story, characters, thought, appearances, diction, and poetic song. For two parts are those which they imitate [1], one part is how they imitate, and three parts are what they imitate; and there is nothing in addition to these. By these, therefore, not a few have been used to say that [something is a tragedy] by these forms.[2] For even appearance has all [of tragedy] [3], and in a similar way, character, story, diction, song, and thought.

But the greatest of these is the synthesis (putting-together) of the actions. For tragedy is an imitation not of human beings but of actions and of life.[4] Both happiness and wretchedness are in action and the goal is some action, not a quality. On the one hand, they [human beings?] are of a certain sort according to their characters, but actions [are of a certain sort] according to happiness or the opposite. So they do not act so as to imitate the characters, but they include characters on account of the actions. So as the actions and the story are the goal (telos) of tragedy, the goal is the greatest of all of them. Moreover, without action tragedy could never come to be, but without characters it could come to be. For the tragedies of most of the latest poets are without characters, and generally many poets are such as this: like the painter Zeuxis is to Polygnotus. For Polygnotus is a good painter of character, but the paintings of Zeuxis do not have character. Yet if someone lines up a row of declarations about character, having made them well concerning speech and thought, he does not make that which was the function of the tragedy, but a tragedy, having supplied these things, is lacking less than one having both a story and a synthesis (putting-together) of actions. In addition to these, the greatest thing of tragedy is the parts of the story that lead the soul: reversal and recognition.[5] A sign of this is that those who attempt to make poetry are first able, like nearly all the first poets, to accurately put together the speech and the characters more than the actions. Story, therefore, is the ruling principle and like the soul of tragedy, and the characters are second. (And it is pretty much the same with painting, for if someone smears on the most beautiful colors in heaps it would not give as much pleasure as an outline of an image in black and white.)


[1] I'm not sure what the 3rd plural "they" is referring to.
[2] The text of this sentence is, to use a scholarly phrase, all jacked up (from the Latin, allus jactus upus). The basic sense seems to be that sometimes tragedy is identified with a particular one of its six parts.
[3] This phrase = a.j.u.
[4] Christ's text includes an extra kakodaimonias ("wretchedness") after biou ("life"). A variant excises it. I followed the variant because I wouldn't know what to do with an extra kakodaimonias.
[5] From LSJ, peripeteia = "sudden reversal of circumstances on which the plot in a Tragedy hinges, such as Oedipus' discovery of his parentage"; this passage from Poetics is cited. And anagnwrisis = "recognition," again a technical term in tragedy, and the Poetics is cited (1452a29 and 1454b19).

Poetics 1449b

For the archon[1] also allowed the comedian a chorus at some late date but they were volunteers. And writers mention crafters (poets) of it (comedy) at the point when this (comedy) already possessed some forms, [2] but who assigned it masks or prologues or a number of actors and any element it has [3] is unknown.

But crafting stories [4] in the beginning came from Sicily, and of those in Athens Krates became the first one who left off the iambic form wholly to craft speeches and stories.

Epic poetry is consistent with tragedy up to the point that it was an imitation by speech with meter of men of substance [5]; but they differ in this respect: by (epic) having the single meter and being narrative, and, morever, in regards to length: on the one hand tragedy especially because it attempts to be under the period of one day or to exceed it just a bit, but epic poetry is without boundary in time and in this respect it differs though at first this was done [6] similarly in tragedies and epics. But in regards to the sections, some of these are (similar) and some particular to tragedy.

Because whoever knows about weighty or trivial tragedy also knows about epics, for the things which epic poetry has belong to tragedy; but the things which tragedy has are not all in epic poetry.

6. We will speak about the mimetic art in hexameter and about the comedic art later.

But concerning tragedy, examining it from the things said so far let us speak about what became the extent of its essence: tragedy, then, is an imitation: of a virtuous action possessing magnanimity in its completion; by means of language sweetened seperately by each of the forms in the parts; and of the men accomplishing the thing, effecting the dissolution of such experiences [7] not through narative (but) through mercy and pity.

With respect to “sweetened language” I mean (language) that has rhythm and harmony and tune; by “the forms separately” I mean that only some things are effected through meter and again other things through song.

And since those men who act craft the imitation, first then, by necessity, some part of tragedy [8] would be the beauty of appearance, then poetic song and diction; for by means of these they craft the imitation.

With respect to “diction” I mean the arrangement of metres, and with respect to “poetic song” the whole apparent sense which it has.

But when the imitation is of an action, and is acted by some people acting, who necessarily are some certain sorts (of people) according to both character and thought—for we say that through these things actions are whatever sorts that they are, and it is by nature that [9] the two causes of actions are thought and character, and people all both hit and miss the mark in respect to these things—indeed the story is the imitation of the action.

[[Note to Burglar: I went past my allotted section but could not find a decent breaking off point—editing of the post is welcome]]

[1] Archon (Plural: Archontes) from the OCD: “In Athens by the 6^th century there were nine annually appointed archons … in the bth century BC the archons and in particular the one entitled archon were the most important officials of the Athenian state … in the later 5^th and 4^th century BC the archons’ duties were particularly religious and judicial … the archon was responsible for a number of religious festivals …”
[2] An awkward sentence to translate literally: the meaning is that by the time we hear about comedians the comedic form already had its basic elements.
[3] Greek is the idiom: “hosa toiouta”
[4] Staying consistent with Burglar: the Greek word is “mythos” ie., myth, which is a problematic concept to translate into English.
[5] mechri + gen = measure or degree: “in so far as; up to the point that”; end of sentence the text has been significantly disputed, I followed R. Kassel, Oxford, 1965: “mechri men tou meta metrou logwi mimesis” because it was the only rendition that made sense to me—which does not necessarily imply it is the correct rendition! Also, I think I have translated “spoudaios” differently every time: here “men of substance” a few sentences down “weighty tragedy”.
[6] poeiw
[7] katharsis twn toioutwn pathematwn. Because Aristotle’s “catharsis” is one of the few ideas from the Classical period that you can mention at a party and not get sent home early, in addition to the above context I offer the reader a summarized dictionary entry for the word:

καθαρσις
I. cleansing from guilt or defilement, purification [sense used in Christian texts]; cleansing of the universe by fire, [Zeno and Chrysippus]; cleansing of food by or before cooking.
II. clarification [Epicurus]
III. Medical: clearing off of morbid humours, etc., evacuation, whether natural or by the use of medicines [cf. Galen.17(2).358]; purification of the menses in women, [Hp.Aph.5.60]. Aristotle’s use is understood under this category:
a. τραγῳδία . . δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων καθαρ. Aristotle, Poetics1449b28; see also Politics 1341b38.
IV. pruning of trees.
V. winnowing of grain.
VI. clearing of land.

[8] I understand Aristotle to be still discussing tragedy’s essence.
[9] LSJ: phuw: B.II.1: “the pf. and aor. 2 take a pres. sense, to be so and so by nature”

Poetics 1449a

So when tragedy and comedy appeared side by side, each starting toward the poesis appropriate according to nature, there came to be some making comedies instead of iambs and others directing tragedies instead of epics, because the forms of these were greater and more honored than the forms of those.

Now to examine whether tragedy is already, with respect to its forms, adequate or not, judging it both by itself and with respect to the audience, is another account. But apart from this then, having come to be from an extemporaneous beginning (both itself and comedy, one from those who lead in dithyrambs and the other from those in phallic songs, which even now in many of the cities continue as customary practice), it increased little by little as the leaders moved forward in as much as came to be apparent to them, and after suffering many changes tragedy stopped when it realized its own nature. And Aeschylus was the first to bring the number of actors from one to two, lessen the chorus, and allow the speech to take the leading role; then Sophocles brought the number of actors to three and allowed scene painting. Still, because it [tragedy] came from satyric drama -- that is, the large from the small stories, and the spoken word from the ridiculous way of speaking -- it has only lately assumed its worthy status. And the meter became iambic from tetrameter. For at first they used tetrameter because the poesis was satyric and suited to dancing, but after the way of speaking came to be, nature herself found the appropriate meter -- iambic is the best of meters for speaking. And a sign of this is that we speak mostly iambs in discussion with one another, but hexameters infrequently and when departing from the settled order of speech. Further, the episodes increased.[1] And so for each of the other things said to have been organized, let them have been spoken of by us, for it would be rather difficult to go through each one.[2]

5. But, as we said, comedy is an imitation of mere trivialities, not however with respect to all vice, but the ridiculous is a proper part of the shameful[3]. For the ridiculous is a sort of mistake and disgrace that is painless and not destructive, such as the ridiculous mask[4]: something ugly and distorted without pain. So the alterations of tragedy and how it came to be have not gone unnoticed, but comedy, because from the beginning it was not serious, went unnoticed.

[1] I'm really not sure what this sentence refers to.
[2] Ignore this footnote.
[3] "shameful" = aiscrhos, which is the same word translated as "ugly" in the next sentence; there's also been some attempt at interpolation in this sentence, which I ignored.
[4] "persona" = prwsopon, which usually means face or visage, but "mask" is the translation actually given in LSJ, s.v., prwsopon, III.

Poetics 1448b

Let these be the matters stated concerning the differences both of the number and some (of the means?) of imitation.

4. Some two causes, and these natural ones, seem to have given birth to poetics.[1]

For both imitating is natural [2] to men from childhood--they differ from the other animals in that [man] is the greatest imitator and he crafts his first acquisitions of knowledge [3] through imitation--and also all men delight in imitations.

And the proof of this is what happens in the event: for we enjoy seeing especially accurate likenesses of things which we observe with discomfort, for example the transformations of the most dishonourable beasts and corpses.[4] And the cause is this: because to learn is supremely enjoyable not only for lovers of wisdom but is so for others in the same way though they share in this for a short time. For because of this those who view the images enjoy them, because it happens that those who observe learn and conclude what each [is]—i.e., this is that. When someone happens not to have previously seen [the object], the imitation does not indeed craft the enjoyment but [it is] through the workmanship or the color [5] or some other such cause.

And since there is in us, according to nature, the imitation of both harmony and rhythm (for it is clear that meters are parts of rhythms) men developed from the beginning [stage], specifically in respect to these things, and progressing little by little, they produced the poetic work from their experimentations[6]; for the more distinguished [poets] imitated excellent deeds and the deeds of those sorts of men, while those of a poorer rate the deeds of petty men [7] at first crafting censorious works, just as the others [crafted] praises and encomia.

While we can mention this sort of poetic work of not one of those prior to Homer, though it is likely there were many, after Homer (for example his Margites and other such sorts of poetical works) there are those beginning with whom the connected iambic meter came—on account of which it is now called “iambic”, because in this meter they “iambicized” (lampooned) each other. Some of the ancients also originated heroic meters and some iambics; and just as Homer was ‘the poet’ in respect to the most weighty matters (because he crafted well but also because he crafted dramatic imitations) so thus he was also the first one who displayed the dramatic poetic forms of comedy, not satirically but humorously; for the Margites has an analogy: as the Iliad and the Odyssey are to tragedies, so is this work to comedies.


[1] “poetics” for the abstract noun “poetikh” as that seems to be general enough to insinuate more than English poesy.
[2] the adjective is a compound (literally “with nature”) that also means, “innate, inborn, inbred.”
[3] Yes this is awkward -- here again I could be accused of overtranslation as “acquisitions of knowledge” is simply one word that is often translated simply as “education” or “lessons” and who “crafts an acquisition”? However, the verb is in the middle voice and I wanted to get across the idea that men ‘make the lessons’ for (or ‘teach’) themselves; simply saying ‘educate’ or ‘learn’ here implies for us a classroom, pedagogical setting, whereas Aristotle is speaking of the nature of man: on his own he is an ‘imitator’ from the first, this is how he learns, and he does it by that same crafting (poiew—the verb that this whole treatise is on) that he uses to make poetical works.
[4] The point is clear, but I really don’t know what this means. Does he mean snake molting and the rotting of corpses?
[5] “superficial appearance”
[6] could also be “impromptus” which resonates with the mention of “rhythm” and “harmony” above, but that English word is understood too exclusively musically, for Ar. clearly understands poetry in general (playwriting verse, etc.) as well as instrument-craft.
[7] here the contrast in the deeds is phaulos and kalos instead of phaulos with spoudaios as above (1448a, section 2, see Burglar’s note #1). If there are objections an aristocratic tone I refer the reader to the Politics.

Poetics 1448a

2. But since those who imitate imitate those acting, and it is necessary that they be either serious or trivial[1] -- for the characters pretty much necessarily follow these alone, for everyone differs in character by vice or virtue[2] -- they imitate either those better than us or worse than us or those such as us, just as the painters. For the portrayals of Polygnotus are better, Pauson worse, and Dionysus similar (to us). And it's also clear that each of the imitations spoken of will have these differences and each will be different by imitating in this manner. For even in dance, aulos-playing, and cithara-playing these differences are possible, as well as in speeches and what is unmetered[3]: those of Homer are better, Cleophon worse, Hegemon the Thrasian, who first made parodies, and Nikochares, who made the Diliad, worse. And similarly also concerning dithyrambs and nomes[4], someone might likewise imitate as Timotheus and Philoxenus did the Cyclopes. And in this difference tragedy also stands apart from comedy: the former wants to imitate those worse, the latter those better, than those now.

3. And yet how someone might imitate each of these is a third difference of them. For even when the imitation is in the same things and of the same things, one might imitate[5] while reporting, either becoming someone different, as Homer does, or as the same person and not changing, or one might imitate as all those who imitate: acting and being at work. As we said at the beginning, imitation is in these three differences: in which, what, and how. So, in one way, as imitator Sophocles would be the same as Homer (for they both imitate serious things) but, in another way, as Aristophanes (for they both imitate those acting and doing). So some say the stage acts (dramata) are so called because they imitate doing (drwntas). Wherefore also the Dorians lay claim to tragedy and comedy -- for indeed the local Megarians lay claim to comedy as having come to be during their democracy, and the Sicilians lay claim for Epicharmus, the poet, was from there (much earlier than Chionides and Magnes), and some of the Peloponnesians lay claim to tragedy -- making names the sign. For the Dorians say they call the suburbs "komas" (though the Athenians call them "demes"), as if comedians were so called not from reveling (komazein) but from going komas to komas, driven in dishonor from the towns. And they name "doing," "dran," but the Athenians name it "prattein."

[1] spoudaious and phaulous
[2] arete and kakia
[3] Literally, "bare metered," which, I think, Thorgerson wants to call prose.
[4] From the OED: Nome: "In ancient Greece: a song or hymn sung in honour of the gods. Also: the genre to which such a song belongs."
[5] I supply the verb both here and below from the previous sentence.

General Note: I've always heard that the text of the Poetics is a mess, but after translating this section, I believe it on the basis of first-hand experience.

Poetics 1447b

Slightly overlaps for reasons of coherence, apologies …

[1] … And the imitation by prose[2] alone or by metred words (verse); and by metered words either joined with one another or a single kind of those metres which happen to be employed at the present time[3]: For really, we have nothing to name in common with those imitations of Sophron and Xenarchos and the Socratic speeches, nor if anyone should craft an imitation[4] through tri-meter [iambics] or elegy or any of the other similar sorts, except that people, joining the meter to the act of crafting, name them “elegaic” and “epic” poets, naming them not from the crafted imitation but by the commonality from the meter.

Thus if they were to produce some medical or naturalist[5] text in meter, they would be customarily likely to name it accordingly [as poetry]; but Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common besides the meter, wherefore to name the poetic work justly, the latter [Empedocles] would be a naturalistic text rather than a poetic work. Similarly if anyone should craft an imitation joining quite every one of the meters together (just as Chairemon crafted the mixed rhapsody “Centuar” from quite every one of the meters), it must be named a poetic work.

Concerning these things, then, let this distinguish the matter.

There are some which use quite all of those mentioned—--and I spoke, for example on rhythm and melody and meter---just as the poetic work of flute-accompanied songs and of harp-accompanied songs and tragic and comedic drama differ because some (use) quite all these at the same time and some in turn. Thus I call these differences of the skilled crafts [techneis] in which[6] the poetic imitation is made.




[1] I agreed with Christ’s punctuation more than Fyfe (the Loeb edition of 1965 that I am using) in that the thought (with Burglar’s translation): “all make the imitation in rhythm and speech and harmony” is the beginning of a somewhat disorganized digression on three different ways that “rhythm, word and harmony” can be seperately or jointly employed in different poetic “imitations”: instrument-playing, dancing and word-compositions.

[2] Phrase literally “bare words” often means “prose”, which makes the most sense here.

[3] Editors have inserted “anwnumos” meaning “nameless” here based on an Arabic text so that the translation would be something like, “a single kind of those metres employed up to the present day which happen to be nameless …” This makes sense with the explanation Aristotle then embarks upon, but I think obscures the real point: the next section is an explanation for why he had to be so vague as to use the phrase “a single kind of those metres which happen to be employed at the present time”—he is being intentionally vague because the terms currently in use (Athens, circa 4th c. BC) are inadequate, which he is trying to correct. Understand the next section as Aristotle’s deconstruction of current categories of labelling according to appearance instead of (what he wants to do) labelling according to the means of “crafting an imitation”.

[4] EDITED. Re: Burglar's efforts to bring my overtranslating back to earth, I have dumped "poetically create an imitation" and now use will use:
"craft" as a translation for the verb "poiew" (as in 'craft a poem')
"poetic work" as a translation for the noun "poeisis"
"craft an imitation" as a translation for the repeated phrase "poeiw mimesin".
This is bound to change, so stay tuned.

[5] I use “naturalist” in the classical Aristotelean sense of “natural philosopher” or “natural scientist” which I think is still more accurate than saying simply “scientist.”

[6] EDITED. This "in which" is a translation of the Greek preposition "en" which is usually just translated as I did here with "in". In the koine Greek of the New Testament, a very frequent 'agreed upon by the authorities' translation of this preposition is "by" as in "by means of". That is more the sense that I get from this sentence as well as the earlier statement it is referring to (see the end of I.4--Burglar's translation: "all make the imitation IN rhythm and speech and harmony"). "In" works perfectly well because we also say for instance a poem "in meter", but the important point for Ar. seems to be that they are imitations IN verse the same way a painting would be an imitation IN oils or IN watercolors -- these different categories of POETIC imitation are separated by the medium they rely on for that imitation.


So, a brief summary of how I understand Aristotle so far: poetic imitations should be so called no matter what form of rhythm or harmony or word, whether of prose, verse or combinations thereof they use, because what matters is whether or not they are “poetically creating an imitation” through a certain set of means. Categories for distinguishing these poetic imitations from each other:
1. the kind of imitation (ie., rhythms, words, harmonies)
2. the object of imitation (heroes or philosophers or lovers, etc)
3. the manner or style of imitation (ie., within the “kinds”, ‘words’ could use prose, verse, or combinations thereof)
Distinguishing poetic imitation from other imitative crafts, such as painting, whereby one also imitates (see I.4a), is the means of imitation (thus the insane frequency of the dative case in these pages). Painters imitate by means of copying postures of figures and colors; the poetic imitations by means of everything you can do with “sound” (I.4b).

Poetics 1447a

Concerning the poetic art -- both itself and its forms, what unique power each has, and how it's necessary to combine the stories if one intends to have poetry beautifully, and out of how many and of what sorts are (its) proper parts, and similarly concerning the others inasmuch as it is of (the same line of) inquiry -- let us speak from the first of the first things according to nature.

Epic poetry and the poetry of tragedy, and also comedy and the art of the dithyrambic poetry, most of the art of the aulos and the art of the cithara, all happen to be, altogether, imitations; but they (imitations) differ from one another in three ways, for (they differ) either by being imitations in (en) different things, of different things, or differently and not in the same manner. For just as some who make semblances imitate many things by colors and figures (some through art and some through convention) and others through the voice[1], so also in the arts spoken of[2] all make the imitation in rhythm and speech and harmony, but these either apart or mixed together, as, for example, both the art of the aulos and the art of the cithara and whatever power happens to be such as these[3], such as the pipes, use harmony and rhythm alone. But the art[4] of the dancers imitates[5] the rhythm itself apart from harmony, for they also imitate, by the arrangement of the rhythms, characters, experiences, and actions. But the art which by bare speeches alone and the one (using) measures, either mixing with the one another or using some one genus of measures, are until now without names. . . .

[1] Christ's text, which I'm using, has "tes phuseos" instead of "tes phones," which would require the translation "nature" instead of "the voice."
[2] Christ breaks the sentence differently than most. He ends 1447a21 after "technais," and begins the next sentence with "hapasai," which runs until 1447a28, where it ends (with a semicolon) after "praxeis." My translation doesn't follow Christ's text here.
[3] Bracketed by Christ.
[4] Supplied by the eta, which I think elides "techne."
[5] Bracketed by Christ (and others).
[6] Bracketed by Christ.