The Maverick Philosopher has a post on why he likes parties:
I like parties. I derive considerable satisfaction from not attending them. There is such a thing as the pleasure of conscious avoidance, of knowing that one has wisely escaped a frustrating and unpleasant situation. If others are offended by my nonattendance, that I regret. But peace of mind is a higher value than social dissipation -- which is no value at all.
I agree with him, but I think it's important to point out that parties and peace of mind are not mutually exclusive. Consider the example of Socrates.
So Agathon was getting up in order to seat himself by Socrates, when suddenly a great crowd of revellers arrived at the door, which they found just opened for some one who was going out. They marched straight into the party and seated themselves: the whole place was in an uproar and, losing all order, they were forced to drink a vast amount of wine. Then, as Aristodemus related, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and some others took their leave and departed; while he himself fell asleep, and slumbered a great while, for the nights were long. He awoke towards dawn, as the cocks were crowing; and immediately he saw that all the company were either sleeping or gone, except Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates, who alone remained awake and were drinking out of a large vessel, from left to right; and Socrates was arguing with them. As to most of the talk, Aristodemus had no recollection, for he had missed the beginning and was also rather drowsy; but the substance of it was, he said, that Socrates was driving them to the admission that the same man could have the knowledge required for writing comedy and tragedy -- that the fully skilled tragedian could be a comedian as well. While they were being driven to this, and were but feebly following it, they began to nod; first Aristophanes dropped into a slumber, and then, as day began to dawn, Agathon also. When Socrates had seen them comfortable, he rose and went away -- followed in the usual manner by my friend; on arriving at the Lyceum, he washed himself, and then spent the rest of the day in his ordinary fashion; and so, when the day was done, he went home for the evening and reposed. (Symposium, 223b-d; trans. Fowler)
Socrates, the consummate philosopher, is the only one left awake at the end of a raucous party in which he has given a beautiful speech (outdoing all the other speeches) on love. He had gone eagerly to the party (though he had been distracted by something on the way) and had even dressed up for the occasion. Here we see Socrates as both the paradigmatic party animal and rational animal.
However, at least in my case (and perhaps in the Maverick Philosopher's case, too), I am too feeble a soul to be both; so I try to live up to my nature as a rational animal and leave the partying to others.
Wednesday, August 17, 2005
Thursday, August 11, 2005
Feeling Old?
So my twenty-ninth birthday is coming in a month or so. And the other day someone asked me what happened on a certain day (August 5, I think) fifteen years ago. So I started thinking: fifteen years ago . . . hmmm . . . that would be 1980 . . . not much happened that year . . . except wasn't Reagan shot that year? . . . so, yeah, I'll go with Reagan getting shot.
Then I realized: fifteen years ago was 1990. Saddam had just invaded Kuwait. I'm stuck thinking that everything that happened more than ten years ago happened in the 80s. I'm not sure I feel old, just confused.
But I can console myself with the knowledge that I now know more about, say, Reagan than any highschool student, not because I've learned something new; they just don't know. I'm starting to figure out how my parents knew so many of the right answers (er, questions) to Jeopardy! and Trivial Pursuit. They knew the answers to the questions involving Nixon and the 1970s because they were alive then. I used to be amazed at their knowledge; now I'm confused about how I came to know so much stuff without trying (and still amazed at my parents, mom).
Then I realized: fifteen years ago was 1990. Saddam had just invaded Kuwait. I'm stuck thinking that everything that happened more than ten years ago happened in the 80s. I'm not sure I feel old, just confused.
But I can console myself with the knowledge that I now know more about, say, Reagan than any highschool student, not because I've learned something new; they just don't know. I'm starting to figure out how my parents knew so many of the right answers (er, questions) to Jeopardy! and Trivial Pursuit. They knew the answers to the questions involving Nixon and the 1970s because they were alive then. I used to be amazed at their knowledge; now I'm confused about how I came to know so much stuff without trying (and still amazed at my parents, mom).
Saturday, July 30, 2005
Meta or Meta?
Peter Leithart has a post about method.
Jean-Luc Marion points out that "method" comes from the Greek meta+hodos, and explains why phenomenology is not methodological: "The method does not run ahead of the phenomenon, by fore-seeing it, pre-dicting it, and pro-ducing it, in order to await it from the outset at the end of the path (meta-hodos) onto which it has just barely set forth." Conversely, philosophy influenced by Descartes is governed by method, which means that all its conclusions were determined at the outset. Methodological philosophy (and its cousin prolegomenal theology) knows from the beginning where it is headed; it immanentizes the eschaton.
Apart from coming near to the etymological fallacy, it seems that Marion (and perhaps Leithart) have left out of consideration the multiple meanings of the Greek word meta. Marion's analysis indicates that he thinks meta means "after"; this is the meaning of the preposition in the title of Aristotle's Metaphysics: the work Metaphysics is so named because in the traditional Aristotelian corpus it was placed after the work Physics.
The problem with Marion's clever point is that meta can also mean "with." (When paired with the accusative case, meta means after; paired with the genitive case, it means with.) Given our common-sense notion of method, it seems more likely that meta means with, so that meta + hodos = "with a way." The ancient (Homeric) meaning of method is "pursuit." To this is added, by the philosophers, especially Plato, the meaning of a principled way of proceeding. (Note that hodos means way or path.) The point of method is not that it determines or knows everything ahead of time (and so can wait at the end of the path (of experience?) but that it provides us an organized (to mix in some Latin) way of moving through the world.
Leithart says that "philosophy influenced by Descartes is governed by method, which means that all its conclusions were determined at the outset." If I understand aright, he means that philosophy influenced by Descartes is deterministic in the sense that the principles (or, conclusions) of that philosophy are set down in stone by the method. But for Descartes especially (and maybe Leithart does not include Descartes in those "influenced by Descartes"), method is the harmonious way of moving through the rational structure of the universe in order to discover the truths about the universe. It is harmonious because it requires the "methodist" to take what the world gives and not invent or tear the world. It is necessary because it is the only way that we can be sure that our conclusions are true. A careful reader of the Meditations will, I think, realize that Descartes's insistence on following the method is for just that purpose.
Aside: for some reason (perhaps it's Gilson?), Descartes is the whipping boy for many people today. Most of those who beat him show only a surface familiarity with him. Further, Leithart's association of method with Descartes is not completely accurate. After all, method is from the Greek methodos, which figures prominently in, among other ancient works, Plato's Sophist and Statesman.
Leithart then says that "Methodological philosophy (and its cousin prolegomenal theology) knows from the beginning where it is headed," which is false. Presuming it's safe to substitute "methodological philosophers" for "methodological philosophy," it seems that Leithart has mixed ontology with epistemology. It is precisely because we do not know what the conclusions are that we must adhere to some method. Without method, according to Descartes, we have no way of knowing what the world is like. We might as well make it up as we go along.
Now, I am not saying that phenomenologists like Husserl (or Marion) make it up as they go along. But they do have a method; it just might not be the Cartesian one.
Slightly related point: I have a friend who once had a bumper sticker with an allusion to the quotation (to which Leithart refers in his last sentence) from Eric Voegelin: "Thou shalt not immanentize the eschaton." (Actually, the quotation from Voegelin is "When the attempt is made, first merely in principle, to immanentize the transcendent eschaton (in the Christian sense of the term), then everything follows from the logic of the approach, right down to the historical fact as the answer to the meaning of self-interpreting existence" [Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 73].) It seems that Voegelin's point is also related to some kind of fixity ("everything follows from the logic of the approach"), but I don't know Voegelin at all and so can't say anything about that.
Jean-Luc Marion points out that "method" comes from the Greek meta+hodos, and explains why phenomenology is not methodological: "The method does not run ahead of the phenomenon, by fore-seeing it, pre-dicting it, and pro-ducing it, in order to await it from the outset at the end of the path (meta-hodos) onto which it has just barely set forth." Conversely, philosophy influenced by Descartes is governed by method, which means that all its conclusions were determined at the outset. Methodological philosophy (and its cousin prolegomenal theology) knows from the beginning where it is headed; it immanentizes the eschaton.
Apart from coming near to the etymological fallacy, it seems that Marion (and perhaps Leithart) have left out of consideration the multiple meanings of the Greek word meta. Marion's analysis indicates that he thinks meta means "after"; this is the meaning of the preposition in the title of Aristotle's Metaphysics: the work Metaphysics is so named because in the traditional Aristotelian corpus it was placed after the work Physics.
The problem with Marion's clever point is that meta can also mean "with." (When paired with the accusative case, meta means after; paired with the genitive case, it means with.) Given our common-sense notion of method, it seems more likely that meta means with, so that meta + hodos = "with a way." The ancient (Homeric) meaning of method is "pursuit." To this is added, by the philosophers, especially Plato, the meaning of a principled way of proceeding. (Note that hodos means way or path.) The point of method is not that it determines or knows everything ahead of time (and so can wait at the end of the path (of experience?) but that it provides us an organized (to mix in some Latin) way of moving through the world.
Leithart says that "philosophy influenced by Descartes is governed by method, which means that all its conclusions were determined at the outset." If I understand aright, he means that philosophy influenced by Descartes is deterministic in the sense that the principles (or, conclusions) of that philosophy are set down in stone by the method. But for Descartes especially (and maybe Leithart does not include Descartes in those "influenced by Descartes"), method is the harmonious way of moving through the rational structure of the universe in order to discover the truths about the universe. It is harmonious because it requires the "methodist" to take what the world gives and not invent or tear the world. It is necessary because it is the only way that we can be sure that our conclusions are true. A careful reader of the Meditations will, I think, realize that Descartes's insistence on following the method is for just that purpose.
Aside: for some reason (perhaps it's Gilson?), Descartes is the whipping boy for many people today. Most of those who beat him show only a surface familiarity with him. Further, Leithart's association of method with Descartes is not completely accurate. After all, method is from the Greek methodos, which figures prominently in, among other ancient works, Plato's Sophist and Statesman.
Leithart then says that "Methodological philosophy (and its cousin prolegomenal theology) knows from the beginning where it is headed," which is false. Presuming it's safe to substitute "methodological philosophers" for "methodological philosophy," it seems that Leithart has mixed ontology with epistemology. It is precisely because we do not know what the conclusions are that we must adhere to some method. Without method, according to Descartes, we have no way of knowing what the world is like. We might as well make it up as we go along.
Now, I am not saying that phenomenologists like Husserl (or Marion) make it up as they go along. But they do have a method; it just might not be the Cartesian one.
Slightly related point: I have a friend who once had a bumper sticker with an allusion to the quotation (to which Leithart refers in his last sentence) from Eric Voegelin: "Thou shalt not immanentize the eschaton." (Actually, the quotation from Voegelin is "When the attempt is made, first merely in principle, to immanentize the transcendent eschaton (in the Christian sense of the term), then everything follows from the logic of the approach, right down to the historical fact as the answer to the meaning of self-interpreting existence" [Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 73].) It seems that Voegelin's point is also related to some kind of fixity ("everything follows from the logic of the approach"), but I don't know Voegelin at all and so can't say anything about that.
The White Path
The Burglar has had this site on the Burgling list for quite some time now, but I wanted to further recommend perusing it. As usual, I discover a site about a month or more after the illlustrious Burglar, only to realize that it has been on the blogroll for ages. My web-surfing is indeed amateur.
Mustafa Akyol is a Muslim who lives in Istanbul, and travels around Europe and occassionally the US for speaking engagements. He seems to be generally committed to Islam's incorporation with the ideals of the free-market of ideas and commerce in the West as far as can be accomplished without comprimising important doctrinal positions. I was directed to him by a comment from Phil Johnson, which I read in this month's Touchstone.
A couple of tidbits from this mornings read, and there are many more interesting looking posts I have yet to peruse like "In Defense of Mary the Virgin" and "Hating America Turkish Style -- This too shall pass" and The Parliament of this World's Religions and the Axis of Theism. Anyway, they all look interesting.
From Intelligent Decline, Revisited
See also, Akyol's Testimony to the Kansas State Education Board
Perhaps most bracing is "Bolshevism in a Headdress: Islamic fundamentalism has more to do with the hatred of the West than with faith"
Here is my theory, and no its not very original. A-thiestic materialism has had its day. It has had a stranglehold on Western political, philosophical and scientific thought, but there is enough of a growing mass of intelligent, reasonable, educated people who have "tasted and seen and touched" and are tired of being ridiculed with "exclusivist rhetoric" (to turn a Berkeley phrase onto its head) into silence. Athiestic materialism will always be tolerated, but in a couple of decades people like Mustafa, and the current supporters of the ID movement will have won the day, and will themselves be in the position to be judged on their (our) ability to tolerate in the open marketplace of ideas. Advance the Day, I say.
Mustafa Akyol is a Muslim who lives in Istanbul, and travels around Europe and occassionally the US for speaking engagements. He seems to be generally committed to Islam's incorporation with the ideals of the free-market of ideas and commerce in the West as far as can be accomplished without comprimising important doctrinal positions. I was directed to him by a comment from Phil Johnson, which I read in this month's Touchstone.
A couple of tidbits from this mornings read, and there are many more interesting looking posts I have yet to peruse like "In Defense of Mary the Virgin" and "Hating America Turkish Style -- This too shall pass" and The Parliament of this World's Religions and the Axis of Theism. Anyway, they all look interesting.
From Intelligent Decline, Revisited
"Actually it is members of the Darwinian camp who employ arguments from ignorance: "We don't know how this evolved, but it must have been somehow" is the kind of answer they give to many complex questions such as the origin of life, biochemical systems, genetic code or the animal phyla. What we find curious is why they ardently presume that every unsolved puzzle will definitely be solved through a materialistic explanation. The only reason is "an a priori commitment to materialism," as the arch-Darwinist Richard Lewontin famously acknowledged a few years ago."
See also, Akyol's Testimony to the Kansas State Education Board
"Most Darwinists have the opposite motive, which are non-theistic worldviews like secular humanism and atheism, which are all driven by the philosophy of Naturalism, also called materialism. And this is all fine; people on both sides of the debate might have motives derived from their philosophical convictions. The problem starts when they seek to impose those beliefs on the institutions of science and government so that their non-theistic worldviews will become the official state ideology. I think this is the current situation in American biology textbooks. Materialism has dominated them and does not allow other views to have a fair share, although it clearly lacks full scientific support."
Perhaps most bracing is "Bolshevism in a Headdress: Islamic fundamentalism has more to do with the hatred of the West than with faith"
Europe has turned out to be a perfect petri dish for growing Islamic radicalism. Muslim communities there consist mostly of poor immigrants living in closed communities. Such a social situation is fertile ground for radicalism, and disenchanted European Muslims have easily been recruited by radical groups. Antoine Sfeir, a French scholar studying Islamic radicalism in Europe, characterizes it as "a kind of combat against the rich and powerful by the poor men of the planet." Oliver Roy, another French expert on Islamic movements, notes, "To convert to Islam today is a way for a European rebel to find a cause; it has little to do with theology." Not surprisingly, Lionel Dumont, an Algerian-born French national suspected of links to al-Qaeda, said that he joined Islam because "the Muslims are the only ones to fight the system."
This fight against "the system" links Islamic radicalism to the Marxist-Leninist radicalism that preceded it. Marxism had a considerable influence on Islamic radicals like Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Mawdudi, and Ali Shariati--architect of the Iranian Revolution. Shariati thought that Islam presented a better ideology and system than Marxism-Leninism for Muslims to topple the "imperialists."
It is thus not surprising to see ex-Marxists join the ranks of Islamic radicals. A compelling example is the recent "conversion" to Islam of Carlos the Jackal, the notorious Marxist terrorist now imprisoned in France. From his prison cell he has penned a book titled Revolutionary Islam. This brand of Islam, he argues, "attacks the ruling classes in order to achieve a more equitable redistribution of wealth" and is the only "transnational force capable of standing up to the enslavement of nations."
Here is my theory, and no its not very original. A-thiestic materialism has had its day. It has had a stranglehold on Western political, philosophical and scientific thought, but there is enough of a growing mass of intelligent, reasonable, educated people who have "tasted and seen and touched" and are tired of being ridiculed with "exclusivist rhetoric" (to turn a Berkeley phrase onto its head) into silence. Athiestic materialism will always be tolerated, but in a couple of decades people like Mustafa, and the current supporters of the ID movement will have won the day, and will themselves be in the position to be judged on their (our) ability to tolerate in the open marketplace of ideas. Advance the Day, I say.
Friday, July 29, 2005
When Disney Was Cool
From the CD insert "Brubeck on Columbia"
"... the 1957 album 'Dave Digs Disney' proved the jazz-worthiness of 'Some day my Prince will come,' 'Alice in Wonderland' and 'When You Wish Upon a Star.'
'That album came from Iola [Dave's wife] buying the yellow plastic 78's of Disney music for the kids,' Brubeck noted. 'We always had a turntable on the road, and the kids were always playing those tunes. We grew to love them, and Paul [Desmond - Sax] loved them too.'"
I'm going to have to check out this record. If anyone has heard it and has a review, drop me a line.
"... the 1957 album 'Dave Digs Disney' proved the jazz-worthiness of 'Some day my Prince will come,' 'Alice in Wonderland' and 'When You Wish Upon a Star.'
'That album came from Iola [Dave's wife] buying the yellow plastic 78's of Disney music for the kids,' Brubeck noted. 'We always had a turntable on the road, and the kids were always playing those tunes. We grew to love them, and Paul [Desmond - Sax] loved them too.'"
I'm going to have to check out this record. If anyone has heard it and has a review, drop me a line.
Wednesday, July 27, 2005
Michael Yon
I've added Michael Yon's blog to the blogroll. He's an independent "reporter" in Iraq. Read his blog for real information on Iraq, not the regurgitated cable and network "news." For some background on Yon, read his interview with Glenn Reynolds.
Other recent additions to the blogroll include Rogue Classicism and Novum Testamentum. If you've got a blog you think I should add, please e-mail me, and I'll take a look.
Other recent additions to the blogroll include Rogue Classicism and Novum Testamentum. If you've got a blog you think I should add, please e-mail me, and I'll take a look.
Friday, July 22, 2005
Living Martyrdom
I used to listen to talk radio all the time when I was commuting everyday to Los Angeles. My two favorite shows quickly became Dennis Prager and Hugh Hewitt partly because they are thoughtful men with good ideas about politics, but mostly because I appreciated the parts of their shows that did not have to do with politics, but with living and culture. Hugh has movie segments, wine segments, literature segments, and Prager has, among other things, the Happiness Hour on Fridays, which I think is one of the most interesting and meaningful mass media events around.
This morning his show happened to coincide with my (late) drive to work, and he started with the basic idea that taking time on a daily basis to make sure that some of your "happiness" needs are met is essential. His negative example of this was that "martyrs" (and I understood him to mean relational martyrs, rather than people who are willing to die for the sake of faith or ideology) are, inside, angry people. Sooner or later (usually sooner) their apparent martyrdom will explode in selfish rage.
At first this seemed somehow wrong, but Prager is a wise man and so I usually try to hear him out with benefit of the doubt: once again he was right. I think of the times in my own marriage when I have tried to go weeks of "sacrificing in love", giving the appearance of denying my own desires to always take care of those of my wife/family. I would make the bed in the morning, put away everyone's laundry, wash dishes, vacuum spontaneously, etc., etc..
It always became obvious to me after a couple of days or a week that this behavior was actually the most selfish, juvenile way to go about things. For one thing, my wife immediately knows every time that I am not happy doing these things. If I'm stomping through the house collecting laundry, I'm not helping anyone and wouldn't they just rather I let there be too much dirty laundry for today and instead spend (non grumpy) time with them? Secondly, if I did not confront myself before I self-inflicted martyrdom to the point of explosion, the anger would always come out as a "Why aren't YOU doing this sort of sacrifice for ME?!?" My supposed absolute gift of my time and energy was a most selfish act because I was doing it with the (not always conscious) expectation that I receive the same or like treatment. Thats the way marriage is supposed to be, right--total selflessness?
One of Prager's constant points is that taking care to be happy is at root unselfish because it relieves pressure from others, it actually makes them happy (who doesn't become more happy when a genuinely happy (not giggly or silly) person is around), and gives us the reserves to truly sacrifice when that sacrifice is actually and desperately needed. It is worth the strain (I am slowly learning) to say, "Honey, I need to spend an hour reading tonight." "Can we go have a cup of coffee, and just sit and relax and not say anything?" "I need to just get outdoors and play a game really hard for a couple hours." These can all seem selfish if they are done at a time when something of "higher value" is in conflict. There is also the obvious danger of self-indulgence.
But after thinking about this today, I have come to the conclusion (and I have done this before, but not as bluntly) that in marriage and family relationships where we have claims on each others use of time, it is essential to ask "What do you need to do each day (or just today) to be happy?" I think in Christian circles, and especially evangelical ones, there is the idea spread that "Jesus is our happiness or joy." "I am happy each day just knowing that Jesus loves me." This may actually work in practical application for some people, but I have never met them: it may be theologically true, but practically it does not happen just because we say it is so. If it does work for you, please pray for me.
If living a forced martyrdom is then bad, how can we tie the Christian life or repentance and sanctification (all of which the church fathers say is bloodless martyrdom) into the overall picture? Acknowledging that one has needs for happiness is not selfish, but honest and actually humiliating. "I'm sorry, but I just can't be happy for you, despite how much I love you, unless I can have some time for X." It is an acknowledgement of our true state, our actual needs, which is at the heart of spirituality, for true martyrdom comes from acknowledging our state of dependence upon the grace of God, Jesus Christ. Further, as Aristotle would tell us, happiness is not simply a fulfillment of desires. Even as one does that-which-can-make-them-happy, they must intentionally focus on becoming happy during that time, or the result will soon stop being achieved. We are come full circle: the work of being happy is done not because it is the fulfillment of all our desires, but for the sake of those who will be affected by us.
This morning his show happened to coincide with my (late) drive to work, and he started with the basic idea that taking time on a daily basis to make sure that some of your "happiness" needs are met is essential. His negative example of this was that "martyrs" (and I understood him to mean relational martyrs, rather than people who are willing to die for the sake of faith or ideology) are, inside, angry people. Sooner or later (usually sooner) their apparent martyrdom will explode in selfish rage.
At first this seemed somehow wrong, but Prager is a wise man and so I usually try to hear him out with benefit of the doubt: once again he was right. I think of the times in my own marriage when I have tried to go weeks of "sacrificing in love", giving the appearance of denying my own desires to always take care of those of my wife/family. I would make the bed in the morning, put away everyone's laundry, wash dishes, vacuum spontaneously, etc., etc..
It always became obvious to me after a couple of days or a week that this behavior was actually the most selfish, juvenile way to go about things. For one thing, my wife immediately knows every time that I am not happy doing these things. If I'm stomping through the house collecting laundry, I'm not helping anyone and wouldn't they just rather I let there be too much dirty laundry for today and instead spend (non grumpy) time with them? Secondly, if I did not confront myself before I self-inflicted martyrdom to the point of explosion, the anger would always come out as a "Why aren't YOU doing this sort of sacrifice for ME?!?" My supposed absolute gift of my time and energy was a most selfish act because I was doing it with the (not always conscious) expectation that I receive the same or like treatment. Thats the way marriage is supposed to be, right--total selflessness?
One of Prager's constant points is that taking care to be happy is at root unselfish because it relieves pressure from others, it actually makes them happy (who doesn't become more happy when a genuinely happy (not giggly or silly) person is around), and gives us the reserves to truly sacrifice when that sacrifice is actually and desperately needed. It is worth the strain (I am slowly learning) to say, "Honey, I need to spend an hour reading tonight." "Can we go have a cup of coffee, and just sit and relax and not say anything?" "I need to just get outdoors and play a game really hard for a couple hours." These can all seem selfish if they are done at a time when something of "higher value" is in conflict. There is also the obvious danger of self-indulgence.
But after thinking about this today, I have come to the conclusion (and I have done this before, but not as bluntly) that in marriage and family relationships where we have claims on each others use of time, it is essential to ask "What do you need to do each day (or just today) to be happy?" I think in Christian circles, and especially evangelical ones, there is the idea spread that "Jesus is our happiness or joy." "I am happy each day just knowing that Jesus loves me." This may actually work in practical application for some people, but I have never met them: it may be theologically true, but practically it does not happen just because we say it is so. If it does work for you, please pray for me.
If living a forced martyrdom is then bad, how can we tie the Christian life or repentance and sanctification (all of which the church fathers say is bloodless martyrdom) into the overall picture? Acknowledging that one has needs for happiness is not selfish, but honest and actually humiliating. "I'm sorry, but I just can't be happy for you, despite how much I love you, unless I can have some time for X." It is an acknowledgement of our true state, our actual needs, which is at the heart of spirituality, for true martyrdom comes from acknowledging our state of dependence upon the grace of God, Jesus Christ. Further, as Aristotle would tell us, happiness is not simply a fulfillment of desires. Even as one does that-which-can-make-them-happy, they must intentionally focus on becoming happy during that time, or the result will soon stop being achieved. We are come full circle: the work of being happy is done not because it is the fulfillment of all our desires, but for the sake of those who will be affected by us.
Thursday, July 21, 2005
The Hobbitual Side of Life
The Burglar has been posting his daily thoughts at a rate like never before and it has convinced me that I no longer have any good excuses to not post. I have recently proved the resurrection of the dead by taking up the practice of daily journalling, and perhaps the energy expended there is the reason for a lack of blogging enthusiasm (not to mention the new baby, who is infinitely more adorable than computers).
In any case, a couple days ago I ran into a vocabulary lapse in the English language and decided to remedy it. Of course, there very may well be a word that already covers this perceived hole, and I am simply unaware. Miro: what is the adjectival form of "hobby"?
I have a hobby of collecting baseball cards. Collecting baseball cards is a _______ activity? My first instinct was that hobby and habit are related, but that does not seem to be the case. Hobby has a slightly confusing entymology (see here and here, but it is certainely not related to habit. So, here is my solution, by association.
I have a habit of smoking.
Smoking is a habitual activity.
I have a hobby of collecting cards.
Collecting cards is a hobbitual activity.
This word is very pleasing to me, especially because of the Middle-Earth resonance (which I could expound upon at length, but will refrain myself, you are welcome). I think that hobbits should be understood as very "hobbitual" beings, for they partake of almost every activity in a very hobbitual way, from gardening to smoking, etc.
I actually think that this vocabulary lack says something about our culture. The dictionary.com reference to habitual(ly) immediately jumps into the negative connotations of something that is habitual, ie. addictive compulsive behavior. Why do we not talk about repetitive behavior in a positive light? Even when someone says, "I run habitually" there is the idea inherent that they have forced themselves into an addiction, and we immediately wait for the explanation: "Oh, I need to lose weight," "It calms me down" [Smoker!], or we sometimes accept the "I need to get away from the house" -- but still a compulsive activity.
I would further maintain (confirmed by a random conversation overheard last night) that any devotion to God is viewed, by the populace at large, to be just such an activity. I resent this because it is entirely improper. There are certainely behaviors that are habitual: constant smoking, brushing teeth, shots of liquor before bed, the way you tie your tie; but they are either the worst of addictions or they are mundane. There needs to be a word in common use that conveys those hobbitual activities of life: those activites that we repeatedly choose to do because we enjoy them as they are.
A further entymological point is the original meaning of the word "habit", now only used to refer to monastic garb. (And here I go off a little bit) Since our friend Charlie Marks has blessed us, the philosophical idea of clothes "habituating" us into our various social categories has taken over the concept of what a habit can do, and has given it those inherent negative implications. Further, it has made us afraid of "habituating" activities, most especially religious education or devotion, and Sayers-ian classical education. I maintain that the human will by nature is not automaton, and the fact that repetitive activity is something that is inherent to all humans is not something to be demonized, but celebrated in its right application. Nor should those bodies who take into account hobbitual man be demonized for their correct anthropology.
I propose a non-violent revolution. Use "hobbitual" with your friends and co-workers. Resurrect the hobbitual side of habits, and today freely and guiltlessly choose a repetitive activity that forms your soul and that you enjoy..
In any case, a couple days ago I ran into a vocabulary lapse in the English language and decided to remedy it. Of course, there very may well be a word that already covers this perceived hole, and I am simply unaware. Miro: what is the adjectival form of "hobby"?
I have a hobby of collecting baseball cards. Collecting baseball cards is a _______ activity? My first instinct was that hobby and habit are related, but that does not seem to be the case. Hobby has a slightly confusing entymology (see here and here, but it is certainely not related to habit. So, here is my solution, by association.
I have a habit of smoking.
Smoking is a habitual activity.
I have a hobby of collecting cards.
Collecting cards is a hobbitual activity.
This word is very pleasing to me, especially because of the Middle-Earth resonance (which I could expound upon at length, but will refrain myself, you are welcome). I think that hobbits should be understood as very "hobbitual" beings, for they partake of almost every activity in a very hobbitual way, from gardening to smoking, etc.
I actually think that this vocabulary lack says something about our culture. The dictionary.com reference to habitual(ly) immediately jumps into the negative connotations of something that is habitual, ie. addictive compulsive behavior. Why do we not talk about repetitive behavior in a positive light? Even when someone says, "I run habitually" there is the idea inherent that they have forced themselves into an addiction, and we immediately wait for the explanation: "Oh, I need to lose weight," "It calms me down" [Smoker!], or we sometimes accept the "I need to get away from the house" -- but still a compulsive activity.
I would further maintain (confirmed by a random conversation overheard last night) that any devotion to God is viewed, by the populace at large, to be just such an activity. I resent this because it is entirely improper. There are certainely behaviors that are habitual: constant smoking, brushing teeth, shots of liquor before bed, the way you tie your tie; but they are either the worst of addictions or they are mundane. There needs to be a word in common use that conveys those hobbitual activities of life: those activites that we repeatedly choose to do because we enjoy them as they are.
A further entymological point is the original meaning of the word "habit", now only used to refer to monastic garb. (And here I go off a little bit) Since our friend Charlie Marks has blessed us, the philosophical idea of clothes "habituating" us into our various social categories has taken over the concept of what a habit can do, and has given it those inherent negative implications. Further, it has made us afraid of "habituating" activities, most especially religious education or devotion, and Sayers-ian classical education. I maintain that the human will by nature is not automaton, and the fact that repetitive activity is something that is inherent to all humans is not something to be demonized, but celebrated in its right application. Nor should those bodies who take into account hobbitual man be demonized for their correct anthropology.
I propose a non-violent revolution. Use "hobbitual" with your friends and co-workers. Resurrect the hobbitual side of habits, and today freely and guiltlessly choose a repetitive activity that forms your soul and that you enjoy..
Wednesday, July 20, 2005
More Fishing Thoughts
For background, see here and here.
I missed the note in Lamb's translation of the Ion on the use of an ox horn in fishing. He says, "the nature of this device is still in dispute. Plutarch (De sollertia animal. 977) supports Aristotle's view that the horn acted as a sheath to protect the line from being bitten through by the fish."
The quotation in the Ion is from the Iliad 24.80: "Down sped she to the depths like a plummet of lead, the which, set upon the horn of an ox of the field, goeth down bearing death to the ravenous fishes" (trans. Murray). The word Murray translates as "plummet of lead" is molu/bdaina, which means a piece of lead and not, in case you were wondering (I was), something like a spear.
To review my interest in ancient fishing practices, in the Sophist, the visitor and Theaetetus agree to call the fishing done during the day by the name of "hooking" since all the fishing that is done during the day uses hooks. But that's strange, because people fish with nets during the day, and nets don't have hooks. So I am still wondering (1) what exactly fishing at night (with torches) looked like and (2) why the distinction between fishing at night and fishing during the day is where it is.
I missed the note in Lamb's translation of the Ion on the use of an ox horn in fishing. He says, "the nature of this device is still in dispute. Plutarch (De sollertia animal. 977) supports Aristotle's view that the horn acted as a sheath to protect the line from being bitten through by the fish."
The quotation in the Ion is from the Iliad 24.80: "Down sped she to the depths like a plummet of lead, the which, set upon the horn of an ox of the field, goeth down bearing death to the ravenous fishes" (trans. Murray). The word Murray translates as "plummet of lead" is molu/bdaina, which means a piece of lead and not, in case you were wondering (I was), something like a spear.
To review my interest in ancient fishing practices, in the Sophist, the visitor and Theaetetus agree to call the fishing done during the day by the name of "hooking" since all the fishing that is done during the day uses hooks. But that's strange, because people fish with nets during the day, and nets don't have hooks. So I am still wondering (1) what exactly fishing at night (with torches) looked like and (2) why the distinction between fishing at night and fishing during the day is where it is.
Tuesday, July 19, 2005
Sayre Gives It Another Try
Recall my earlier quandary about the night fishing described in Plato's Sophist. I examined a possible explanation from Kenneth Sayre's Plato's Late Ontology. Here is another explanation from his earlier book Plato's Analytic Method.
It is essential to specify that the angler strikes his prey from below, for example, to distinguish him from the net -- or spear -- fisherman; and if we assume angling without bait, daylight appears essential to enable the angler to see the fish he is attempting to hook. (143)
In a footnote to this sentence, Sayre states:
As described, in angling "a hook is used, and the fish is not struck in any chance part of his body, as he is with the spear, but only about the head and mouth . . ." (220E-221A). This suggests that Plato is thinking of a mode of fishing in which the prey is not induced to take the hook within its mouth.
Notice that this is a different explanation than his later one in Plato's Late Ontology. Maybe he found this explanation unsatisfying? I do.
First, I am suspicious that Plato has in mind fishing without bait. If there are any anglers reading this blog, I would appreciate any insight about the likelihood that one would angle without bait. Do the fish swim up to the hook out of curiosity?
Second, I don't see what about 220e-221a indicates that the fish is not induced to take the hook in his mouth. If one were trying to hook without bait, it seems one could try to hook the fish just about anywhere. I take it that the phrase "about the head and mouth" (peri\ th\n kefalh\n kai\ to\ sto/ma) is to specify which part of the head needs to be hooked. Would the angler hook him in the eye?
So the placement of a distinction between night fishing and day fishing in the account of the angler still puzzles me.
It is essential to specify that the angler strikes his prey from below, for example, to distinguish him from the net -- or spear -- fisherman; and if we assume angling without bait, daylight appears essential to enable the angler to see the fish he is attempting to hook. (143)
In a footnote to this sentence, Sayre states:
As described, in angling "a hook is used, and the fish is not struck in any chance part of his body, as he is with the spear, but only about the head and mouth . . ." (220E-221A). This suggests that Plato is thinking of a mode of fishing in which the prey is not induced to take the hook within its mouth.
Notice that this is a different explanation than his later one in Plato's Late Ontology. Maybe he found this explanation unsatisfying? I do.
First, I am suspicious that Plato has in mind fishing without bait. If there are any anglers reading this blog, I would appreciate any insight about the likelihood that one would angle without bait. Do the fish swim up to the hook out of curiosity?
Second, I don't see what about 220e-221a indicates that the fish is not induced to take the hook in his mouth. If one were trying to hook without bait, it seems one could try to hook the fish just about anywhere. I take it that the phrase "about the head and mouth" (peri\ th\n kefalh\n kai\ to\ sto/ma) is to specify which part of the head needs to be hooked. Would the angler hook him in the eye?
So the placement of a distinction between night fishing and day fishing in the account of the angler still puzzles me.
Monday, July 18, 2005
Pinsky on Dante and Computers
From the Atlantic Monthly a while back (subscription required):
Question: Edward Hirsch, in a review of your Inferno in The New Yorker, describes terza rima and says the effect is like "moving through a series of interpenetrating rooms . . . or going down a set of winding stairs." Is there any connection between the spiraling form of Dante's poem and the way computers appeal to our imaginations?
Pinsky: I think so: there is the elegance and compression of something systematic or technical; and then there is the wildness or variation of our feelings -- a grid, and a flow -- that is the essence of terza rima, and in a way the essence of the many swirls and dips and abundance that flow from the binary guts of computing.
Question: Edward Hirsch, in a review of your Inferno in The New Yorker, describes terza rima and says the effect is like "moving through a series of interpenetrating rooms . . . or going down a set of winding stairs." Is there any connection between the spiraling form of Dante's poem and the way computers appeal to our imaginations?
Pinsky: I think so: there is the elegance and compression of something systematic or technical; and then there is the wildness or variation of our feelings -- a grid, and a flow -- that is the essence of terza rima, and in a way the essence of the many swirls and dips and abundance that flow from the binary guts of computing.
All Quiet in the Apartment Complex
It's been quieter than usual in the apartment complex today. There's usually a good amount of screaming kids, but not today. I wonder if they're all inside reading the new Harry Potter. That'd be at least one reason to thank Rowling.
On an unrelated note, I saw The Fantastic Four with the Bourgeois Wife on Friday. My expectations weren't high, but I was still a bit disappointed, especially with the final fight scene. For a final fight scene in a superhero movie, it was too brief.
On an unrelated note, I saw The Fantastic Four with the Bourgeois Wife on Friday. My expectations weren't high, but I was still a bit disappointed, especially with the final fight scene. For a final fight scene in a superhero movie, it was too brief.
Wednesday, July 13, 2005
Friday, July 08, 2005
Fishing at Night
In the Sophist (220), the visitor from Elea and Theaetetus try to come up with a kind of definition of what an angler is. To do this they use the method of division, which is nothing more than taking a class of things and then dividing it in two by some criterion. For example, they divide hunting into hunting of land animals and hunting of swimming animals. Then they divide hunting of swimming animals into fishing and fowling. Then they divide fishing into fishing by netting and fishing by striking (with a spear or hook).
At this point in the division they make what seems to me to be a curious division. They divide fishing by striking (which includes both angling and spearing, since the spears (tridents) have hooks on them) into fishing at night and fishing during day. This division seems out of place. Why didn't it come prior to the division into fishing with hooks and fishing with nets. Can't both of them be done either at night or in the day?
Kenneth Sayre offers a suggestion about this division. "To the modern fisherman [this is] an unfamiliar form of angling, undoubtedly. A quotation from Homer at Ion 538d removes the puzzlement of why angling must be performed in daylight" (Plato's Late Ontology, 308n40).
Here's the quotation from Homer in the Ion: "And she passed to the bottom like a lead sinker which, set on a horn from an ox of the field, goes in haste to bring mischief among the ravenous fishes" (trans. Lamb). From what I can gather from this quotation, a fisherman would probably cut a small hole in the tip of an ox horn, put a line through the hole, attach a lead sinker to the end of the line, drop the horn in the water, and when a fish swam into the horn, he would pull the horn out of the water with the fish trapped in the horn. Clearly, this could be best (or only) done during the day since the fisherman would need to be able to see the fish swimming into the horn.
If this is correct, then Sayre's explanation cannot be right because, Theaetetus and the visitor having gone with the daytime division, the visitor clearly states that the kind of angling they're considering is "done with a hook" and hooks not "just any part of the fish's body but always [its] head" (220e-221a, trans. White). This description does not fit the one given in the Ion, and I remain puzzled both about what nocturnal fishing in ancient Greece was like and the placement in the Sophist of the daytime/nighttime division.
One completely unrelated point: when I was writing this I noticed that it was natural to write the phrase "fishing at night," but when I started to write the corresponding phrase "fishing at day" I noticed it didn't sound right. So I changed it to "fishing during day." I could also have said "fishing in day." Curious that modern English will allow "at night" but not "at day."
At this point in the division they make what seems to me to be a curious division. They divide fishing by striking (which includes both angling and spearing, since the spears (tridents) have hooks on them) into fishing at night and fishing during day. This division seems out of place. Why didn't it come prior to the division into fishing with hooks and fishing with nets. Can't both of them be done either at night or in the day?
Kenneth Sayre offers a suggestion about this division. "To the modern fisherman [this is] an unfamiliar form of angling, undoubtedly. A quotation from Homer at Ion 538d removes the puzzlement of why angling must be performed in daylight" (Plato's Late Ontology, 308n40).
Here's the quotation from Homer in the Ion: "And she passed to the bottom like a lead sinker which, set on a horn from an ox of the field, goes in haste to bring mischief among the ravenous fishes" (trans. Lamb). From what I can gather from this quotation, a fisherman would probably cut a small hole in the tip of an ox horn, put a line through the hole, attach a lead sinker to the end of the line, drop the horn in the water, and when a fish swam into the horn, he would pull the horn out of the water with the fish trapped in the horn. Clearly, this could be best (or only) done during the day since the fisherman would need to be able to see the fish swimming into the horn.
If this is correct, then Sayre's explanation cannot be right because, Theaetetus and the visitor having gone with the daytime division, the visitor clearly states that the kind of angling they're considering is "done with a hook" and hooks not "just any part of the fish's body but always [its] head" (220e-221a, trans. White). This description does not fit the one given in the Ion, and I remain puzzled both about what nocturnal fishing in ancient Greece was like and the placement in the Sophist of the daytime/nighttime division.
One completely unrelated point: when I was writing this I noticed that it was natural to write the phrase "fishing at night," but when I started to write the corresponding phrase "fishing at day" I noticed it didn't sound right. So I changed it to "fishing during day." I could also have said "fishing in day." Curious that modern English will allow "at night" but not "at day."
Tuesday, June 28, 2005
The Lord's Name in Vain?
From Plato's Sophist (248e-249a), translated by Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem:
Stranger: What the Zeus! Shall we be that easily persuaded that motion and life and soul and thought are truly not present in utterly complete Being? That it neither lives nor thinks; but awful and holy, not possessed of mind, it stands there, not to be moved?
Theaetetus: That, Stranger, would be a terrible account to grant.
Stranger: What the Zeus! Shall we be that easily persuaded that motion and life and soul and thought are truly not present in utterly complete Being? That it neither lives nor thinks; but awful and holy, not possessed of mind, it stands there, not to be moved?
Theaetetus: That, Stranger, would be a terrible account to grant.
Monday, June 20, 2005
Marriage a Sacrament
In my life, and probably that of most westerners, the months of May and June are the season of wedlock. In light of that I dedicate my reentry to blogging, Marriage.
I recently heard marriage defined as "an emotional attachment between two people." I think this is meaningless. I have an emotional attachment to my late dog, as well as to some very nice trees.
The Orthodox Church teaches that marriage is a sacrament, and I will try to elucidate this meaning.
As I have said previously, a working definition of a sacrament is a visible manifestation of invisible grace in the company of the Body of Christ. For marriage to be a sacrament means that it is holy and set apart as a special instance whereby the salvation and sanctification of those who partake is intended. Just like baptism, chrismation, communion, confession, or ordination, the Church's blessing on this act both sanctifies the institution and institutes sanctifying power into the act.
Importantly, to insist that marriage is a sacrament also necessitates that it be given this special meaning when it is partaken of within the body of Christ. Marriage is a communal act, but not just because friends and family party with us. Many Eastern Orthodox theologians point out the striking similarities in the Eastern Rite between the marriage and ordination services. In many ways, a priest is wedded to the Church (ie., the language of Ephesians ala Christ and the Church), and so the marriage institution should be seen as a similarly profound vocation. Where the priest will administer grace through his administration of sacraments, the couple administers grace to one another through their daily interraction of love.
I recently read a review on a book that argued for a confusion of the traditional social understanding of marriage (basically, a vague and flexible union; an informal arrangement to pass on property) by Victorian and Romantic conceptions of love inspired by Enlightment "self-fulfillment". This may or may not be the case for society at large, as the author's conclusion was "we're stuck with marrying for love and accepting the
consequences of living happily ever after—until someone better comes along". It is not, however, true of a truly sacramental marriage. If sacraments are manifestations of divine love (grace), marriage is no different.
A man and a woman will often have a very special emotional bond to one another, but in the end that is not what binds a sacramental marriage. It is rather a committment to Divine Love, which the two have chosen to make manifest through marriage. The Love of Christ to be made manifest between husband and wife.
In the Church, the priest manifests his love for Christ (and indeed, actually loves Christ) by loving his congregation. In the same way, the determination of the husband and the wife to love one another for the sake of Divine Love is a mode of salvation and sanctification for the couple.
As a counter example to explain my point. I was given a Bible for married persons, in which there was included a short story of a woman, bemoaning the fact that she had just had a beautiful devotional time (I am recalling from memory), and was "feeling very holy and close to God," she went to bed and her husband rolled over and gently touched her arm. "'I knew what that meant ... there went all my feelings of spirituality for the sake of a quickie.'" I am saying the exact opposite of this. There is no contrast between any part of a healthy marriage and the sanctification potential therein: the submission of one's self to the spouse and his or her well-being is administration of Divine Grace, and is profitable for salvation. "Self-fulfillment" is subsumed by submission to Divine Love first; the social contract "exchange of property" is fulfilled as Grace infiltrates the relationship; family becomes "little church" and man and woman become "little Christ's" to one another.
I recently heard marriage defined as "an emotional attachment between two people." I think this is meaningless. I have an emotional attachment to my late dog, as well as to some very nice trees.
The Orthodox Church teaches that marriage is a sacrament, and I will try to elucidate this meaning.
As I have said previously, a working definition of a sacrament is a visible manifestation of invisible grace in the company of the Body of Christ. For marriage to be a sacrament means that it is holy and set apart as a special instance whereby the salvation and sanctification of those who partake is intended. Just like baptism, chrismation, communion, confession, or ordination, the Church's blessing on this act both sanctifies the institution and institutes sanctifying power into the act.
Importantly, to insist that marriage is a sacrament also necessitates that it be given this special meaning when it is partaken of within the body of Christ. Marriage is a communal act, but not just because friends and family party with us. Many Eastern Orthodox theologians point out the striking similarities in the Eastern Rite between the marriage and ordination services. In many ways, a priest is wedded to the Church (ie., the language of Ephesians ala Christ and the Church), and so the marriage institution should be seen as a similarly profound vocation. Where the priest will administer grace through his administration of sacraments, the couple administers grace to one another through their daily interraction of love.
I recently read a review on a book that argued for a confusion of the traditional social understanding of marriage (basically, a vague and flexible union; an informal arrangement to pass on property) by Victorian and Romantic conceptions of love inspired by Enlightment "self-fulfillment". This may or may not be the case for society at large, as the author's conclusion was "we're stuck with marrying for love and accepting the
consequences of living happily ever after—until someone better comes along". It is not, however, true of a truly sacramental marriage. If sacraments are manifestations of divine love (grace), marriage is no different.
A man and a woman will often have a very special emotional bond to one another, but in the end that is not what binds a sacramental marriage. It is rather a committment to Divine Love, which the two have chosen to make manifest through marriage. The Love of Christ to be made manifest between husband and wife.
In the Church, the priest manifests his love for Christ (and indeed, actually loves Christ) by loving his congregation. In the same way, the determination of the husband and the wife to love one another for the sake of Divine Love is a mode of salvation and sanctification for the couple.
As a counter example to explain my point. I was given a Bible for married persons, in which there was included a short story of a woman, bemoaning the fact that she had just had a beautiful devotional time (I am recalling from memory), and was "feeling very holy and close to God," she went to bed and her husband rolled over and gently touched her arm. "'I knew what that meant ... there went all my feelings of spirituality for the sake of a quickie.'" I am saying the exact opposite of this. There is no contrast between any part of a healthy marriage and the sanctification potential therein: the submission of one's self to the spouse and his or her well-being is administration of Divine Grace, and is profitable for salvation. "Self-fulfillment" is subsumed by submission to Divine Love first; the social contract "exchange of property" is fulfilled as Grace infiltrates the relationship; family becomes "little church" and man and woman become "little Christ's" to one another.
Monday, May 30, 2005
Blog meets Real World: A Second Opinion
Blog met real world for Thorgersen in several ways this last month.
I had the end of term madness that Burglar is now caving under, and then in an unprecedented real world encounter, internet got cut out of my old apartment, and the new apartment has now been a week sans internet due to the great customer service at Cal's residential computing offices. And yes, we are all going through withdrawal.
I do not intend to "continue posting" as I have been. My summer goal is to post something meaningful (relatively of course) once a week. I look forward to resuming the honorable endeavor of this website with my two accomplices in the near future. Until then, I await a real internet connection and continue to bemoan the travesties of the real world. May our faithful viewing public grant us patience.
I had the end of term madness that Burglar is now caving under, and then in an unprecedented real world encounter, internet got cut out of my old apartment, and the new apartment has now been a week sans internet due to the great customer service at Cal's residential computing offices. And yes, we are all going through withdrawal.
I do not intend to "continue posting" as I have been. My summer goal is to post something meaningful (relatively of course) once a week. I look forward to resuming the honorable endeavor of this website with my two accomplices in the near future. Until then, I await a real internet connection and continue to bemoan the travesties of the real world. May our faithful viewing public grant us patience.
Thursday, May 19, 2005
Blog World Meets Real World
Well, my postings haven't exactly been prodigious, but lurking around the blogosphere eats up more of my time than I'd like to admit. I suppose I could just limit myself to posting, but for some reason I haven't been able to separate the minimally time-consuming posting here from the maximally time-consuming blog reading elsewhere. So I'm going to have to go on hiatus for a few weeks. I've got some very important deadlines (i.e., if I don't work to meet them, I'll end up out of grad school and in the real real world) and I need to dedicate my time to them. Though there may be some occasional Republic translations, since they correspond to some of my deadlines, this is it from me for a few weeks. Whether the other two burglars will "continue" to post, I do not know. I think Thorgerson and Le Complice must have gotten fingered and picked up.
Thursday, May 12, 2005
Republic 330c9-d3
"You speak the truth," he said.
"That's entirely so," I said. "But tell me a bit more: Of the many things you have earned, what do you suppose is the greatest good you have benefited from?"
Stay tuned for Cephalus's answer.
"That's entirely so," I said. "But tell me a bit more: Of the many things you have earned, what do you suppose is the greatest good you have benefited from?"
Stay tuned for Cephalus's answer.
Wednesday, May 11, 2005
New Pollock Paintings Found
Jackson Pollock is one of my favorite painters, and I'm excited to see what will come from this somewhat startling find.
Pollock in person could be a real jerk, just like Edna St. Vincent Millay. Since I'm quite keen on (as the British say) both of them, I'm now trying to reassure myself that all the artists I like aren't jerks: T. S. Eliot (could be crabby), Ezra Pound (either insane or fascist or both), W. H. Auden (relatively nice guy; insecure), Mark Rothko (suicidal). Hmmm. With the exception of Auden, it's not boding well. Wait! Robert Pinsky.
Suspended Student Sues University
He was caught cheating on a corporate ethics quiz. Joanne Jacobs calls it "Corporate Prep."
This strikes me as similar to something a friend of mine once told me. He worked in a Christian bookstore, and he said the books most shoplifted were Bibles. Doh! You shouldn't steal Bibles, nor cheat on ethics assignments.
HT: Joanne Jacobs
This strikes me as similar to something a friend of mine once told me. He worked in a Christian bookstore, and he said the books most shoplifted were Bibles. Doh! You shouldn't steal Bibles, nor cheat on ethics assignments.
HT: Joanne Jacobs
Saturday, May 07, 2005
Republic 330b8-c8
"I bring this up," I said, "because you did not seem to me to care very much for money, and this is what many people will do about whatever they have not earned themselves. But those having earned it really cling to it twice as much as the others. For just as poets are fond of their poems and fathers of their children, so also those who have made money are serious about money, as their own handiwork, yet serious for the same reason as other people: for its advantages. Accordingly, it is difficult to be with them: they are willing to approve of nothing but wealth."
This is Socrates speaking to Cephalus. The grammar at one point is slightly ambiguous and leads to different senses of the passage. The sticking point is understanding the preposition kata at 330c6. With the accusative (th\n xrei/an) the best option in this context is to translate it as a purpose clause. Most translations go this way. However, Grube/Reeve (it's Reeve's revision; Grube originally translated it as "besides") translate the phrase as "they don't just care about it because it's useful, as other people do." Their translation implies that there is a difference between the place given to money by those who have made money and those who have not. Since this is the accusative case, translating kata as "against" is out. The only way to get a sense of opposition is by using the spatial sense of kata metaphorically. I'll just say that this seems unlikely since the genitive case is available.
So the grammar is against Grube/Reeve, but perhaps the sense is not. The analogy running through the paragraph is that poets and fathers treat their respective creations differently than others do. By extension, one would think that Socrates' point is that money makers treat their money differently than others do. But using the purpose sense of kata seems to go against the analogy: it's saying that money makers and non-money makers alike are serious about money because of its advantages.
However, I think that the analogy works if we limit its sense to the idea that people are fond of their own creations in ways that others are not. The point is that poets, fathers, and money makers all give pride of place to their "offspring." It is just that in the case of money, the money makers are serious about money for the same reason as others.
Reading Plato, or old books in general, reminds us that nothing much changes. There are still people who make money and think of nothing else, and it remains just as difficult to be around them.
This is Socrates speaking to Cephalus. The grammar at one point is slightly ambiguous and leads to different senses of the passage. The sticking point is understanding the preposition kata at 330c6. With the accusative (th\n xrei/an) the best option in this context is to translate it as a purpose clause. Most translations go this way. However, Grube/Reeve (it's Reeve's revision; Grube originally translated it as "besides") translate the phrase as "they don't just care about it because it's useful, as other people do." Their translation implies that there is a difference between the place given to money by those who have made money and those who have not. Since this is the accusative case, translating kata as "against" is out. The only way to get a sense of opposition is by using the spatial sense of kata metaphorically. I'll just say that this seems unlikely since the genitive case is available.
So the grammar is against Grube/Reeve, but perhaps the sense is not. The analogy running through the paragraph is that poets and fathers treat their respective creations differently than others do. By extension, one would think that Socrates' point is that money makers treat their money differently than others do. But using the purpose sense of kata seems to go against the analogy: it's saying that money makers and non-money makers alike are serious about money because of its advantages.
However, I think that the analogy works if we limit its sense to the idea that people are fond of their own creations in ways that others are not. The point is that poets, fathers, and money makers all give pride of place to their "offspring." It is just that in the case of money, the money makers are serious about money for the same reason as others.
Reading Plato, or old books in general, reminds us that nothing much changes. There are still people who make money and think of nothing else, and it remains just as difficult to be around them.
Volokh on Facts and Values
Eugene Volokh, of the Volokh Conspiracy, writes:
Even if one believe[s] that certain things are objectively immoral, one should recognize that such a judgment is not the sort of thing that one should label "fact"; if anything, we should be teaching students to better distinguish facts from value judgments, even while recognizing that value judgments may be very important and even objectively right.
To my mind, this statement is a mess, but perhaps I'm not seeing clearly. There's a few things clouding my vision.
If I only believe something, I could be wrong. If I know something, I cannot be wrong. (This is not the same as saying that if I think I know something, I cannot be wrong.) For example, I can never know that I had oatmeal for breakfast this morning because it's false that I had oatmeal for breakfast this morning. Note that this is different from saying that I can never know the details of what happened in the duel between Hamilton and Burr. In the first case, I cannot have knowledge because the claim is false. In the second case, I cannot have knowledge because the evidence does not rise to the level of knowledge. (After examining the evidence available, I might lean one way or the other, but not enough to say that I know what happened.)
So when Volokh writes that "Even if one believe[s] . . ." I don't know whether he's playing on the distinction between believing and knowing. If he means that "Even if one knows that certain things are objectively immoral . . . one should [not label them as fact]," then I think he's wrong. If what Volokh means is that "Even if one only believes [i.e., doesn't know] that certain things are objectively immoral . . . one should [not label them as fact]," then he's right to say that we shouldn't label our judgment a fact. If we want to be responsible in our labeling, we should wait until we know that something is a fact before we label it as fact. Which of these Volokh has in mind is the first thing that is unclear to me. Here's the second.
What is the difference between a fact and an objectively correct value judgment? I take "fact" to mean the way things are. Not very illuminating, I know. The point is that facts are basic. A fact is the way the world is. So, if grass is green, then it's a fact that grass is green. If F=MA, then it's a fact that F=MA. Sometimes people use "fact" and "correct" or "right" or "true" synonymously. That's misleading. We say that a judgment about a fact is correct or incorrect, right or wrong, and that statements about facts are either true or false. If I judge that grass is green, then my judgment is correct. If I say "Grass is green," then my statement is true.
Volokh wants to distinguish between facts and "value judgments." In a trivial sense, I agree. A judgment is a mental act. A value judgment, then, is a mental act about values. A fact is the way the world is. Clearly, mental acts are not the same as the world's being a certain way, and though there are facts about mental acts, this should not lead us to conflate the two. To be precise, we should speak of judgments about value and judgments about facts. (Maybe Volokh thinks that one does not make judgments about facts. I disagree, but I'll save that for another day.)
But I do not think that Volokh meant to state the obvious that mental acts are not the same as the way the world is. Here are two possible further interpretations.
(a) He might mean that judgments about facts are not the same as judgments about values. In some cases this is true; in others, false. It is true in cases where the value judgment is nonnormative, for example, in the claim that I prefer strawberry icecream to vanilla. In this case, I can make no legitimate claim to normativity, that is, that everybody ought to prefer strawberry to vanilla. So in cases where the distinction is between judgments about facts and judgments about nonnormative values, Volokh is right to insist on a difference between fact and value.
But in cases where the value judgment is normative, for example, that one ought to be courageous (or, controversially, that one ought not engage in homosexual acts) then it is in the same boat as judgments about facts. Why? Because normative judgments depend upon there being a fact of the matter in order to be normative. Normative value judgments are significantly like judgments of fact: they are either right or wrong (and the corresponding claims based on the judgments are either true or false). What makes both of them right and wrong is the world's being a certain way.
(b) He might mean that facts are scientific or empirical or some other such thing and that values are nonempirical or nonscientific. This claim can only be supported by arbitrarily restricting our use of "fact." Facts are the way(s) the world is. Some facts are facts about the way the world is scientifically. They tell us about the chemical or biological parts of the world. Now the question is Is there a fact of the matter about the way the world is morally? If so, then let's call those ways facts. If not, then we can call them something else. The important point is that we can't say that we need to limit our use of "fact" prior to discovering whether there is a fact of the matter about the way the world is morally.
So here's why I'm confused. Volokh says that we can recognize that "value judgments may be . . . objectively right"; here he seems to think that there might be a fact of the matter about morality. But he also says that judgments about value are not the same as facts (or, to be precise, judgments about facts). These are incompatible claims.
Now, in both (a) and (b) there are issues of whether there are any normative value judgments and whether there are moral facts of the matter about the way the world is. I think that these are essentially the same issue. Since I haven't given an argument that there are any normative value judgments, one might think that my critique of Volokh is pointless. But, on the other side, in order to show that the usual (but false) distinction between fact and value is real, one has to give an argument that there is a difference. Volokh hasn't done this, and so my critique of his claims doesn't require that I show there isn't one.
Even if one believe[s] that certain things are objectively immoral, one should recognize that such a judgment is not the sort of thing that one should label "fact"; if anything, we should be teaching students to better distinguish facts from value judgments, even while recognizing that value judgments may be very important and even objectively right.
To my mind, this statement is a mess, but perhaps I'm not seeing clearly. There's a few things clouding my vision.
If I only believe something, I could be wrong. If I know something, I cannot be wrong. (This is not the same as saying that if I think I know something, I cannot be wrong.) For example, I can never know that I had oatmeal for breakfast this morning because it's false that I had oatmeal for breakfast this morning. Note that this is different from saying that I can never know the details of what happened in the duel between Hamilton and Burr. In the first case, I cannot have knowledge because the claim is false. In the second case, I cannot have knowledge because the evidence does not rise to the level of knowledge. (After examining the evidence available, I might lean one way or the other, but not enough to say that I know what happened.)
So when Volokh writes that "Even if one believe[s] . . ." I don't know whether he's playing on the distinction between believing and knowing. If he means that "Even if one knows that certain things are objectively immoral . . . one should [not label them as fact]," then I think he's wrong. If what Volokh means is that "Even if one only believes [i.e., doesn't know] that certain things are objectively immoral . . . one should [not label them as fact]," then he's right to say that we shouldn't label our judgment a fact. If we want to be responsible in our labeling, we should wait until we know that something is a fact before we label it as fact. Which of these Volokh has in mind is the first thing that is unclear to me. Here's the second.
What is the difference between a fact and an objectively correct value judgment? I take "fact" to mean the way things are. Not very illuminating, I know. The point is that facts are basic. A fact is the way the world is. So, if grass is green, then it's a fact that grass is green. If F=MA, then it's a fact that F=MA. Sometimes people use "fact" and "correct" or "right" or "true" synonymously. That's misleading. We say that a judgment about a fact is correct or incorrect, right or wrong, and that statements about facts are either true or false. If I judge that grass is green, then my judgment is correct. If I say "Grass is green," then my statement is true.
Volokh wants to distinguish between facts and "value judgments." In a trivial sense, I agree. A judgment is a mental act. A value judgment, then, is a mental act about values. A fact is the way the world is. Clearly, mental acts are not the same as the world's being a certain way, and though there are facts about mental acts, this should not lead us to conflate the two. To be precise, we should speak of judgments about value and judgments about facts. (Maybe Volokh thinks that one does not make judgments about facts. I disagree, but I'll save that for another day.)
But I do not think that Volokh meant to state the obvious that mental acts are not the same as the way the world is. Here are two possible further interpretations.
(a) He might mean that judgments about facts are not the same as judgments about values. In some cases this is true; in others, false. It is true in cases where the value judgment is nonnormative, for example, in the claim that I prefer strawberry icecream to vanilla. In this case, I can make no legitimate claim to normativity, that is, that everybody ought to prefer strawberry to vanilla. So in cases where the distinction is between judgments about facts and judgments about nonnormative values, Volokh is right to insist on a difference between fact and value.
But in cases where the value judgment is normative, for example, that one ought to be courageous (or, controversially, that one ought not engage in homosexual acts) then it is in the same boat as judgments about facts. Why? Because normative judgments depend upon there being a fact of the matter in order to be normative. Normative value judgments are significantly like judgments of fact: they are either right or wrong (and the corresponding claims based on the judgments are either true or false). What makes both of them right and wrong is the world's being a certain way.
(b) He might mean that facts are scientific or empirical or some other such thing and that values are nonempirical or nonscientific. This claim can only be supported by arbitrarily restricting our use of "fact." Facts are the way(s) the world is. Some facts are facts about the way the world is scientifically. They tell us about the chemical or biological parts of the world. Now the question is Is there a fact of the matter about the way the world is morally? If so, then let's call those ways facts. If not, then we can call them something else. The important point is that we can't say that we need to limit our use of "fact" prior to discovering whether there is a fact of the matter about the way the world is morally.
So here's why I'm confused. Volokh says that we can recognize that "value judgments may be . . . objectively right"; here he seems to think that there might be a fact of the matter about morality. But he also says that judgments about value are not the same as facts (or, to be precise, judgments about facts). These are incompatible claims.
Now, in both (a) and (b) there are issues of whether there are any normative value judgments and whether there are moral facts of the matter about the way the world is. I think that these are essentially the same issue. Since I haven't given an argument that there are any normative value judgments, one might think that my critique of Volokh is pointless. But, on the other side, in order to show that the usual (but false) distinction between fact and value is real, one has to give an argument that there is a difference. Volokh hasn't done this, and so my critique of his claims doesn't require that I show there isn't one.
Tuesday, May 03, 2005
Should Be Studying; Doing This Instead
From Jonathan and Thorgerson and Matt.
1. You are stuck inside Fahrenheit 451. What book would you be?
Aquinas's Summa Theologiae.
2. Have you ever had a crush on a fictional character?
Maybe I had a crush on Nancy Drew. Can't remember.
3. What was the last book you bought?
Philosophical Writings of Descartes (three vols.)
4. What are you currently reading?
Language, Proof, and Logic, Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy
Aristotle East and West, David Bradshaw
Plato's Sophist, trans. Nicholas White
Ethics in Finance, John Boatright
5. What five books would you take to a deserted island?
(Again, assuming the Bible and Shakespeare are already there)
Complete works of Plato (with Greek facing)
Iliad and Odyssey (with Greek facing)
Beowulf (Heaney trans. with Old English facing)
Divine Comedy
Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl (contrary to Matt, this work, not Barth, is the culmination of modern thought)
6. To whom are you going to pass this book meme and why?
No one. Why not?
1. You are stuck inside Fahrenheit 451. What book would you be?
Aquinas's Summa Theologiae.
2. Have you ever had a crush on a fictional character?
Maybe I had a crush on Nancy Drew. Can't remember.
3. What was the last book you bought?
Philosophical Writings of Descartes (three vols.)
4. What are you currently reading?
Language, Proof, and Logic, Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy
Aristotle East and West, David Bradshaw
Plato's Sophist, trans. Nicholas White
Ethics in Finance, John Boatright
5. What five books would you take to a deserted island?
(Again, assuming the Bible and Shakespeare are already there)
Complete works of Plato (with Greek facing)
Iliad and Odyssey (with Greek facing)
Beowulf (Heaney trans. with Old English facing)
Divine Comedy
Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl (contrary to Matt, this work, not Barth, is the culmination of modern thought)
6. To whom are you going to pass this book meme and why?
No one. Why not?
Tuesday, April 19, 2005
"The Church Has not Disappeared but Is Continuing . . ."
This is some great stuff from an interview with the then Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, in September 2003. (HT to Hugh) The context is discussing what the faithful of the Catholic Church should do in the wake of the sexual abuse scandals in the USA. To say these comments are encouraging would be understatement. One of the things that I have heard comment on most often from protestants about liturgical tradiations is the lack of emphasis on and acknowledgement of "personal relationship" with the Divine. Against that compare these comments from the new Pope. Pretty exciting I say.
____________________________________
Raymond: You, I know, have been closely involved with the continuing crisis in the United States, trying to bring closure a healing in the wake of terrible sexual abuse in the United States. My question is, “What do you identify as the root causes of this crisis that we continue to live through in the United States?”
Cardinal: I will distinguish perhaps between 2 different elements – a general element and a specific element of this time and of this scandal of today. The general element is, as I said, is a weakness of human beings, even of priests. Never will we have all this end, but always the temptations of human beings are present also for the priests. So always we have to accept that. Even in the communion of priests and bishops, we have to know that these things can happen. The second point is more specific, why at this time it was so often and it was more than in past times. And I think the essential point is the weakness of faith, because only if I am really in confidence personally with the Lord; if the Lord is for me, not an idea, but the Person of my deepest friendship; if I know personally the Lord and be in contact of love everyday in the Lord, if for me faith is the reality. It is the ground of my life; it is a most sure of reality, and not some possibility – in this case, if I am really convinced and really in contact of love with the Lord, the Lord will help me in these temptations and I can even win what seems impossible. If the faith is not everyday realized, if the faith is weakened and begins only to be an hypothesis, so it’s not a fundamental of your life and so begins all these problems. So, I would say the essential point is for me, weakness of the faith and not a sufficient presence of the faith in the Church. I think it was the problem of the last 40, 50 years. That the idea was we have common ideas with all the world and that faith is very personal and a universal gift of the Lord was not so present. So, I think the first point is re-learn, re-convert to a deepened faith and education in the faith. I think also that in the last perhaps 40, 50 years, it was not so clear the validity of the moral teaching of the Church. We had so many masters in the Church that teach in other ways, and said, “No, this is not a sin. This is not a sin. This is common and what is average of doing is also permitted.” And with this idea, we do not have a clear moral teaching. We have to learn from the normal actions of human beings. So, we also will be in the normal actions and even …
Raymond: Fall prey unto the things of the world.
Cardinal: Yes. Yes. Yes. So, I think that 2 things are essential – conversion to a profound and deep faith with the life of prayer and the sacraments, and clear moral teaching and conviction of these teachings that the Church, has the Holy Spirit and can give this way.
Raymond: What would you say to the faithful, who in the United States are so despondent at this hour, and not sure who to look to? What would you say to them?
Cardinal: Yes. On the one hand, look to the Lord is the first point. He is always present and He’s always near to us. Look also to the saints of all the times, and so find in our times the saints. The humble, faithful persons are present, perhaps not so visible because they are not appearing on the television. But the humble, praying people are present today and this is a confidence of the Church and of all our people find these people, finds that with all the problems of today, the Church has not disappeared; but is continuing, especially in not so visible personalities. So, I think this is essential – find the Lord, find the saints of the times, but also find the not canonized, simple persons who are really in the heart of the Church.
The Entire Interview
____________________________________
Raymond: You, I know, have been closely involved with the continuing crisis in the United States, trying to bring closure a healing in the wake of terrible sexual abuse in the United States. My question is, “What do you identify as the root causes of this crisis that we continue to live through in the United States?”
Cardinal: I will distinguish perhaps between 2 different elements – a general element and a specific element of this time and of this scandal of today. The general element is, as I said, is a weakness of human beings, even of priests. Never will we have all this end, but always the temptations of human beings are present also for the priests. So always we have to accept that. Even in the communion of priests and bishops, we have to know that these things can happen. The second point is more specific, why at this time it was so often and it was more than in past times. And I think the essential point is the weakness of faith, because only if I am really in confidence personally with the Lord; if the Lord is for me, not an idea, but the Person of my deepest friendship; if I know personally the Lord and be in contact of love everyday in the Lord, if for me faith is the reality. It is the ground of my life; it is a most sure of reality, and not some possibility – in this case, if I am really convinced and really in contact of love with the Lord, the Lord will help me in these temptations and I can even win what seems impossible. If the faith is not everyday realized, if the faith is weakened and begins only to be an hypothesis, so it’s not a fundamental of your life and so begins all these problems. So, I would say the essential point is for me, weakness of the faith and not a sufficient presence of the faith in the Church. I think it was the problem of the last 40, 50 years. That the idea was we have common ideas with all the world and that faith is very personal and a universal gift of the Lord was not so present. So, I think the first point is re-learn, re-convert to a deepened faith and education in the faith. I think also that in the last perhaps 40, 50 years, it was not so clear the validity of the moral teaching of the Church. We had so many masters in the Church that teach in other ways, and said, “No, this is not a sin. This is not a sin. This is common and what is average of doing is also permitted.” And with this idea, we do not have a clear moral teaching. We have to learn from the normal actions of human beings. So, we also will be in the normal actions and even …
Raymond: Fall prey unto the things of the world.
Cardinal: Yes. Yes. Yes. So, I think that 2 things are essential – conversion to a profound and deep faith with the life of prayer and the sacraments, and clear moral teaching and conviction of these teachings that the Church, has the Holy Spirit and can give this way.
Raymond: What would you say to the faithful, who in the United States are so despondent at this hour, and not sure who to look to? What would you say to them?
Cardinal: Yes. On the one hand, look to the Lord is the first point. He is always present and He’s always near to us. Look also to the saints of all the times, and so find in our times the saints. The humble, faithful persons are present, perhaps not so visible because they are not appearing on the television. But the humble, praying people are present today and this is a confidence of the Church and of all our people find these people, finds that with all the problems of today, the Church has not disappeared; but is continuing, especially in not so visible personalities. So, I think this is essential – find the Lord, find the saints of the times, but also find the not canonized, simple persons who are really in the heart of the Church.
The Entire Interview
Sunday, April 17, 2005
Something New for the Classicists to Do
Smart people at Oxford have invented a way to recover the text of papyri from an Egyptian dump. The papyri were discovered about 100 years ago, but no one has been able to read them until now.
Apparently, they've already recovered some Sophocles that was previously completely unknown. I'm pulling for a copy of Plato's lecture on the good to be among the papyri. If that's not available, some dialogues of Aristotle will do.
Apparently, they've already recovered some Sophocles that was previously completely unknown. I'm pulling for a copy of Plato's lecture on the good to be among the papyri. If that's not available, some dialogues of Aristotle will do.
Saturday, April 16, 2005
Edna St. Vincent Millay: Christian Poet?
I've been an admirer of the poetry of Edna St. Vincent Millay for a while. She is a modern master of the sonnet. Consider this:
What lips my lips have kissed, and where, and why,
I have forgotten, and what arms have lain
Under my head till morning; but the rain
Is full of ghosts tonight, that tap and sigh
Upon the glass and listen for reply . . .
Or her poem "Grown-up":
Was it for this I uttered prayers,
And sobbed and cursed and kicked the stairs,
That now, domestic as a plate,
I should retire at half-past eight?
I did not know what kind of person she was, and I always assumed she was something like Sylvia Plath. So I was bit surprised to see her described by Dallas Willard as a "Christian poet." Intrigued by this possibility, I read her biography by Nancy Milford. It turns out that unless the seven deadly sins have been repealed, Millay's standing among the saints is nonexistent. Of course, when one says this, it must always be with the caveat that only God knows the heart. Perhaps her behavior belied her Christian beliefs, but if Milford's biography is comprehensive (which I think it is), then Millay never seems to have had much interest in Christianity.
Her life was full of impropriety, but no life is untouched by that, so hers is not distinguished in that respect. But contrast her life with that of another public figure, Johnny Cash, and one sees that the unpleasantness and impropriety of her life seemed to mount at the end of her life, as if her life had been propped up by youth and vigor then fell into disarray at the end. On the other hand, Cash's youthful antics are well-known, but he eventually renounced them for a life of virtue, and his later work seems to have been just as good (if not better) than his earlier. This is due, I think, to the fact that he corralled his dissipation in middle age. Millay did not, and her work seems to have suffered from this, though I am no expert on her work. Cash's happiness at the end of his life is plain; Millay's life did not end very happily. (There may also be something to Cash's being raised by devout Christian parents whereas Millay was not. Cash's wife, June Carter, also strikes me as more virtuous, perhaps because more stubborn, than Millay's husband, Eugen Boissevain.)
Now I think it is possible for Millay to have written Christian poetry without having been a Christian herself. Her poetry does contain Christian symbolism and themes, and the poem Willard cites ("Feast") seems to be evidence of this. So she may be a Christian poet in that respect. I would prefer to say that her poetry is Christian while she herself may not have been. (Note that her middle name, "St. Vincent," is a reference to the hospital where she was born. Many of her close friends called her "Vincent" or "Vince.")
Milford's biography, by the way, was a good read, but she seemed to commit what C. S. Lewis called the "personal heresy" quite a bit: the clue to understanding Millay's poetry is to understand part of her biography. I disagree with this principle, but that's for another day.
What lips my lips have kissed, and where, and why,
I have forgotten, and what arms have lain
Under my head till morning; but the rain
Is full of ghosts tonight, that tap and sigh
Upon the glass and listen for reply . . .
Or her poem "Grown-up":
Was it for this I uttered prayers,
And sobbed and cursed and kicked the stairs,
That now, domestic as a plate,
I should retire at half-past eight?
I did not know what kind of person she was, and I always assumed she was something like Sylvia Plath. So I was bit surprised to see her described by Dallas Willard as a "Christian poet." Intrigued by this possibility, I read her biography by Nancy Milford. It turns out that unless the seven deadly sins have been repealed, Millay's standing among the saints is nonexistent. Of course, when one says this, it must always be with the caveat that only God knows the heart. Perhaps her behavior belied her Christian beliefs, but if Milford's biography is comprehensive (which I think it is), then Millay never seems to have had much interest in Christianity.
Her life was full of impropriety, but no life is untouched by that, so hers is not distinguished in that respect. But contrast her life with that of another public figure, Johnny Cash, and one sees that the unpleasantness and impropriety of her life seemed to mount at the end of her life, as if her life had been propped up by youth and vigor then fell into disarray at the end. On the other hand, Cash's youthful antics are well-known, but he eventually renounced them for a life of virtue, and his later work seems to have been just as good (if not better) than his earlier. This is due, I think, to the fact that he corralled his dissipation in middle age. Millay did not, and her work seems to have suffered from this, though I am no expert on her work. Cash's happiness at the end of his life is plain; Millay's life did not end very happily. (There may also be something to Cash's being raised by devout Christian parents whereas Millay was not. Cash's wife, June Carter, also strikes me as more virtuous, perhaps because more stubborn, than Millay's husband, Eugen Boissevain.)
Now I think it is possible for Millay to have written Christian poetry without having been a Christian herself. Her poetry does contain Christian symbolism and themes, and the poem Willard cites ("Feast") seems to be evidence of this. So she may be a Christian poet in that respect. I would prefer to say that her poetry is Christian while she herself may not have been. (Note that her middle name, "St. Vincent," is a reference to the hospital where she was born. Many of her close friends called her "Vincent" or "Vince.")
Milford's biography, by the way, was a good read, but she seemed to commit what C. S. Lewis called the "personal heresy" quite a bit: the clue to understanding Millay's poetry is to understand part of her biography. I disagree with this principle, but that's for another day.
Monday, April 11, 2005
Scientists Talking about Ethics
It usually doesn't provide sound results. Consider, for example, an excerpt of an editorial from the recent Science, ominously titled "Twilight for the Enlightenment?"
Finally, certain kinds of science are now proscribed on what amount to religious grounds. Stem cell research is said by its opponents to pose a "moral dilemma." Yet this well-advertised dilemma does not arise from a confrontation between science and ethical universals. Instead, the objections arise from a particular belief about what constitutes a human life: a belief held by certain religions but not by others. Some researchers, eager to resolve the problem, seek to derive stem cells by techniques that might finesse the controversy. But the claim that the stem cell "dilemma" rests on universal values is a false claim, and for society to accept it to obtain transitory political relief would bring church and state another step closer.
It's difficult to determine the exact target of this paragraph, or what the objectionable statements the author has in mind are. But a few things are clear. The author thinks that a proposition expresses an "ethical universal" only if it is believed by all people. This is false. A statement expressing a universal (or objective) fact about ethics is either true or false regardless of who believes it. It is similar to the universal law of gravity. The law of gravity is still universally valid even if not everyone believes it to be true. The same goes for ethical facts.
Our author ignores this point when he states that objections to stem-cell research (presumably of the embryonic kind) "arise from a particular belief about what constitutes a human life: a belief held by certain religions but not by others." But if there is a fact of the matter about what a human being is, then a human being will have certain properties regardless of whether everyone believes that human beings have those properties.
The author also suggests that these universal facts of ethics can only be tenably held by religious people. This is also false. Many facts of ethics can be known apart from the special revelation of a religion. For example, one does not need to believe in the veracity of the Bible in order to know that kindness is a virtue, not a vice. Whether or not the ethical facts relevant to the debate over stem-cell research fall into this category is an open question, but one should not assume that objections to embryonic stem-cell research must be made on religious grounds. Realizing this obviates the worry that agreeing with objections to stem-cell research legitimizes the position of "the church." (One should also note the assumption that science is part of the state. Since when is science identifiable with the state?)
Scientists often claim that philosophers or theologians wrongly impinge upon scientific territory and make pronouncements about science without being qualified to do so. Since the problem is a lack of qualification, it is just as wrong for a scientist to speak about matters of ethics when they are not qualified to do so, and in light of the basic mistakes noted above, the author of the Science editorial is clearly not qualified to speak about ethics.
Finally, certain kinds of science are now proscribed on what amount to religious grounds. Stem cell research is said by its opponents to pose a "moral dilemma." Yet this well-advertised dilemma does not arise from a confrontation between science and ethical universals. Instead, the objections arise from a particular belief about what constitutes a human life: a belief held by certain religions but not by others. Some researchers, eager to resolve the problem, seek to derive stem cells by techniques that might finesse the controversy. But the claim that the stem cell "dilemma" rests on universal values is a false claim, and for society to accept it to obtain transitory political relief would bring church and state another step closer.
It's difficult to determine the exact target of this paragraph, or what the objectionable statements the author has in mind are. But a few things are clear. The author thinks that a proposition expresses an "ethical universal" only if it is believed by all people. This is false. A statement expressing a universal (or objective) fact about ethics is either true or false regardless of who believes it. It is similar to the universal law of gravity. The law of gravity is still universally valid even if not everyone believes it to be true. The same goes for ethical facts.
Our author ignores this point when he states that objections to stem-cell research (presumably of the embryonic kind) "arise from a particular belief about what constitutes a human life: a belief held by certain religions but not by others." But if there is a fact of the matter about what a human being is, then a human being will have certain properties regardless of whether everyone believes that human beings have those properties.
The author also suggests that these universal facts of ethics can only be tenably held by religious people. This is also false. Many facts of ethics can be known apart from the special revelation of a religion. For example, one does not need to believe in the veracity of the Bible in order to know that kindness is a virtue, not a vice. Whether or not the ethical facts relevant to the debate over stem-cell research fall into this category is an open question, but one should not assume that objections to embryonic stem-cell research must be made on religious grounds. Realizing this obviates the worry that agreeing with objections to stem-cell research legitimizes the position of "the church." (One should also note the assumption that science is part of the state. Since when is science identifiable with the state?)
Scientists often claim that philosophers or theologians wrongly impinge upon scientific territory and make pronouncements about science without being qualified to do so. Since the problem is a lack of qualification, it is just as wrong for a scientist to speak about matters of ethics when they are not qualified to do so, and in light of the basic mistakes noted above, the author of the Science editorial is clearly not qualified to speak about ethics.
Sunday, April 03, 2005
Lives Well Spent
There has been a lot to think about recently. The imminent passings of Terry Schiavo, Pope John Paul II, and my sinful self (Forgiveness Sunday ... yes YOU ALL celebrate Easter on the wrong date) have been on my mind for at least the last two weeks. So much has been said so well, that I will not pretend to have anything to add, specifically on the life of the Pontiff, who surely falls in the short list of greatest men of this century, and perhaps the Greatest Christian Leader my generation will see. [[On that note, I would be interested to hear the personal reactions of my evangelical friends: sad event, happy event, etc.]]
Ran On. Back to subject. Because this has been on my mind, I was surprised yesterday to awake with great joyful anticipation. I was able to relax and have more joy playing with my daughter than I think I have experienced in at least two months. (This is not counting the screaming fit that I was in charge of at 4:30 a.m.)
Today my Beloved and I explored the very large park behind our home, to a greater extent than we have done before. It was a sublime day: idyllic spring weather. High clouds, stunning deep blue, smell of recent rain, slightly muddy trails, clear air, distant sea, song birds, soaring hawks, bees, wildflowers. Hills. I got to hike 2 miles longer than the others (we forgot about the car ... don't ask), and it gave me a chance to think in the way that is natural to me.
It is my goal as a father, and eventually will be as a teacher, to teach others how to die well. To do this one must have a dual approach: to teach how to live, and to hold up as models those who have also died well.
For the Christian, dying is the beginning of life. Dying is the opening of our eyes and soul. It opens to us the Undiscovered Country. If it is life actualized, then by learning life we will prepare ourselves for it. But this is where things get confusing.
The one element that is of course the most important and least mentioned is that to live one must die. Here, I realized, is the mystery of Christian teaching on life. Here is why those who demand life for themselves have produced a "culture of death", while those who demand the acceptance of death to themselves produce the "culture of life." The Christian does not fear death because he has truly died already in baptism.
This is why baptism MUST be sacramental, and why it MUST initiate entry into the covenantal life of the Church.
The Christian parent teaches their children about life by showing them the true meaning of death, and the waking death that is called suffering. In the Antiochian Vespers, Psalm 104 is always read at the beginning of prayer. I quote the last half of the Chapter:
19. He appointed the moon for seasons: the sun knoweth his going down.
20. Thou makest darkness, and it is night: wherein all the beasts of the forest do creep forth.
21. The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God.
22. The sun ariseth, they gather themselves together, and lay them down in their dens.
23. Man goeth forth unto his work and to his labour until the evening.
24. O LORD, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches.
25. So is this great and wide sea, wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts.
26. There go the ships: there is that leviathan, whom thou hast made to play therein.
27. These wait all upon thee; that thou mayest give them their meat in due season.
28. That thou givest them they gather: thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good.
29. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust.
30. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth.
31. The glory of the LORD shall endure for ever: the LORD shall rejoice in his works.
32. He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth: he toucheth the hills, and they smoke.
33. I will sing unto the LORD as long as I live: I will sing praise to my God while I have my being.
34. My meditation of him shall be sweet: I will be glad in the LORD.
35. Let the sinners be consumed out of the earth, and let the wicked be no more. Bless thou the LORD, O my soul. Praise ye the LORD.
There is too much here to provide a detailed analysis--and I have used too many words to say too little already, but note especially v. 29 to the end. All die, and then they are created by His Spirit. My mind stuck here for the entireity of the service.
The Sustainer of Life, and Lord of Creation brooks no rival in any corner of His creation: not the Leviathan in the sea, nor sin in the heart of man.
Die, O my soul. Repent, Die, and Live.
Ran On. Back to subject. Because this has been on my mind, I was surprised yesterday to awake with great joyful anticipation. I was able to relax and have more joy playing with my daughter than I think I have experienced in at least two months. (This is not counting the screaming fit that I was in charge of at 4:30 a.m.)
Today my Beloved and I explored the very large park behind our home, to a greater extent than we have done before. It was a sublime day: idyllic spring weather. High clouds, stunning deep blue, smell of recent rain, slightly muddy trails, clear air, distant sea, song birds, soaring hawks, bees, wildflowers. Hills. I got to hike 2 miles longer than the others (we forgot about the car ... don't ask), and it gave me a chance to think in the way that is natural to me.
It is my goal as a father, and eventually will be as a teacher, to teach others how to die well. To do this one must have a dual approach: to teach how to live, and to hold up as models those who have also died well.
For the Christian, dying is the beginning of life. Dying is the opening of our eyes and soul. It opens to us the Undiscovered Country. If it is life actualized, then by learning life we will prepare ourselves for it. But this is where things get confusing.
The one element that is of course the most important and least mentioned is that to live one must die. Here, I realized, is the mystery of Christian teaching on life. Here is why those who demand life for themselves have produced a "culture of death", while those who demand the acceptance of death to themselves produce the "culture of life." The Christian does not fear death because he has truly died already in baptism.
This is why baptism MUST be sacramental, and why it MUST initiate entry into the covenantal life of the Church.
The Christian parent teaches their children about life by showing them the true meaning of death, and the waking death that is called suffering. In the Antiochian Vespers, Psalm 104 is always read at the beginning of prayer. I quote the last half of the Chapter:
19. He appointed the moon for seasons: the sun knoweth his going down.
20. Thou makest darkness, and it is night: wherein all the beasts of the forest do creep forth.
21. The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God.
22. The sun ariseth, they gather themselves together, and lay them down in their dens.
23. Man goeth forth unto his work and to his labour until the evening.
24. O LORD, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches.
25. So is this great and wide sea, wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts.
26. There go the ships: there is that leviathan, whom thou hast made to play therein.
27. These wait all upon thee; that thou mayest give them their meat in due season.
28. That thou givest them they gather: thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good.
29. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust.
30. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth.
31. The glory of the LORD shall endure for ever: the LORD shall rejoice in his works.
32. He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth: he toucheth the hills, and they smoke.
33. I will sing unto the LORD as long as I live: I will sing praise to my God while I have my being.
34. My meditation of him shall be sweet: I will be glad in the LORD.
35. Let the sinners be consumed out of the earth, and let the wicked be no more. Bless thou the LORD, O my soul. Praise ye the LORD.
There is too much here to provide a detailed analysis--and I have used too many words to say too little already, but note especially v. 29 to the end. All die, and then they are created by His Spirit. My mind stuck here for the entireity of the service.
The Sustainer of Life, and Lord of Creation brooks no rival in any corner of His creation: not the Leviathan in the sea, nor sin in the heart of man.
Die, O my soul. Repent, Die, and Live.
Friday, April 01, 2005
"Normal Activities"
Legendary rocker Neil Young underwent minimally invasive brain surgery on Tuesday. His agent released a statement:
"The procedure corrected the problem and has been characterized as a complete success with a total recovery. And resumption of normal activities by the 59-year-old rock legend is predicted for the near future."
My question: Exactly what are "normal activities" for a 59-year-old rock legend?
Also, Brian Kruse, if you're out there, I hope you weren't too panicked about Neil's surgery. You were almost apoplectic when he cut his finger and had to cancel a few shows.
"The procedure corrected the problem and has been characterized as a complete success with a total recovery. And resumption of normal activities by the 59-year-old rock legend is predicted for the near future."
My question: Exactly what are "normal activities" for a 59-year-old rock legend?
Also, Brian Kruse, if you're out there, I hope you weren't too panicked about Neil's surgery. You were almost apoplectic when he cut his finger and had to cancel a few shows.
"Clinging to Life"
This is the description of the Bishop of Rome given by CNN. I beg to differ. John Paul II is not clinging to life. He is about to enter the larger life, as some Christians say. For many people living today, death is the great evil to be avoided at any costs. I think that is why people would rather live longer than live well. The Bishop of Rome does not, I think, share that delusion.
I've always liked D. L. Moody's remark about his death, which has been paraphrased so often, it's difficult to know his exact words, but they were something very close to this:
"Someday you will read in the papers that D. L. Moody of East Northfield is dead. Don’t you believe a word of it! At that moment I shall be more alive than I am now; I shall have gone up higher, that is all, out of this old clay tenement into a house that is immortal -- a body that death cannot touch, that sin cannot taint; a body fashioned like unto His glorious body."
I've always liked D. L. Moody's remark about his death, which has been paraphrased so often, it's difficult to know his exact words, but they were something very close to this:
"Someday you will read in the papers that D. L. Moody of East Northfield is dead. Don’t you believe a word of it! At that moment I shall be more alive than I am now; I shall have gone up higher, that is all, out of this old clay tenement into a house that is immortal -- a body that death cannot touch, that sin cannot taint; a body fashioned like unto His glorious body."
Thursday, March 31, 2005
A Good Day
(1) I finished refinishing some furniture for the apartment. For some reason, doing manual labor is really appealing to me after spending ten weeks doing nothing but mental work.
(2) I restarted the Republic translation.
(2) I restarted the Republic translation.
Greek Font
I've started using the SP Ionic font for Greek. If the Gr. is jibberish in the post below, that probably means you don't have SP Ionic installed. You can get it for free here.
Republic 330a7-b7
"Well, in which way, Cephalus," I said, "did you gain the most -- did you inherit it or did you earn it?"
"What's this 'did I earn?' Socrates," he said. "As a businessman, I have come to be somewhere between my grandfather and father. For my grandfather and namesake, having inherited something close to what I now have earned, made it many times larger. But Lysanias my father thereafter made less of the same substance. I would be pleased if I did not leave to my sons here less than this, but, even in some small way, more than what I inherited."
[I'm trying to use "well" to capture the force of de/. Gr. has the word po/terov, which means "whether of the two?" It's not really translatable, but I've rendered it "in which way." "The most" is really "the more" (ta\ plei/wn), but it is bad English to use the comparative to say "gain the more."
Adam offers the translation "Do you want to know what I acquired, Socrates?" He gives some reasons for it, but I'm an inadequate judge of whether he or, say, Shorey or Bloom is correct. The translations of the latter two invoke the sense of derision, which Adam rejects, in C.'s question.
"Businessman" is a translation of xrhmatisth\v. It may be a bit anachronistic, if one takes it to imply the existence of a free market economy. But LSJ also offer "a man in business." (It's odd that "man of business" is offered in the Middle Liddell but not in LSJ, is it not?) Strictly speaking, it is in the nominative case, but I've made it the object of an adverbial phrase in order to make it sound right in English.
The verb "have come to be" is ge/gona, from gi/gnomai, whose usual meaning is to be born or to come into being. It's meaning here seems to be the latter, though the former is not completely absent.
A question: Is it worthwhile to examine the fact that C. was somewhere in between his father and grandfather? Chronologically, he is not in between them but after them.
See Shorey for the bit about the namesake. The fact that grandsons often took on their grandfather's name leads to a bit of confusion about who's who in Plato's world. For example, exactly how many Critias's are there in Plato's world? See this book for a detailed hypothesis.
I'm not quite sure how to translate the phrase I translated "I would be pleased if I did not leave . . . less than this." In Gr. it's e)gw de\ a)gapw= e)a\n mh\ e)la/ttw katali/pw tou/toisin. The difficulty is deciding whether or not a)gapw= is subjunctive or not. I think it is because it's followed by e'an, but then one would expect katali/pw in the indicative. It's not; it's aorist. So I'm probably missing something.
"My sons here" is only tou/toisin, "these," in the Gr., but it seems clear that he's referring to someone close by, and since the discussion is about inheritance, his sons are the obvious choice.
In the sequel, we find out why S. asks C. about how he got his money.]
"What's this 'did I earn?' Socrates," he said. "As a businessman, I have come to be somewhere between my grandfather and father. For my grandfather and namesake, having inherited something close to what I now have earned, made it many times larger. But Lysanias my father thereafter made less of the same substance. I would be pleased if I did not leave to my sons here less than this, but, even in some small way, more than what I inherited."
[I'm trying to use "well" to capture the force of de/. Gr. has the word po/terov, which means "whether of the two?" It's not really translatable, but I've rendered it "in which way." "The most" is really "the more" (ta\ plei/wn), but it is bad English to use the comparative to say "gain the more."
Adam offers the translation "Do you want to know what I acquired, Socrates?" He gives some reasons for it, but I'm an inadequate judge of whether he or, say, Shorey or Bloom is correct. The translations of the latter two invoke the sense of derision, which Adam rejects, in C.'s question.
"Businessman" is a translation of xrhmatisth\v. It may be a bit anachronistic, if one takes it to imply the existence of a free market economy. But LSJ also offer "a man in business." (It's odd that "man of business" is offered in the Middle Liddell but not in LSJ, is it not?) Strictly speaking, it is in the nominative case, but I've made it the object of an adverbial phrase in order to make it sound right in English.
The verb "have come to be" is ge/gona, from gi/gnomai, whose usual meaning is to be born or to come into being. It's meaning here seems to be the latter, though the former is not completely absent.
A question: Is it worthwhile to examine the fact that C. was somewhere in between his father and grandfather? Chronologically, he is not in between them but after them.
See Shorey for the bit about the namesake. The fact that grandsons often took on their grandfather's name leads to a bit of confusion about who's who in Plato's world. For example, exactly how many Critias's are there in Plato's world? See this book for a detailed hypothesis.
I'm not quite sure how to translate the phrase I translated "I would be pleased if I did not leave . . . less than this." In Gr. it's e)gw de\ a)gapw= e)a\n mh\ e)la/ttw katali/pw tou/toisin. The difficulty is deciding whether or not a)gapw= is subjunctive or not. I think it is because it's followed by e'an, but then one would expect katali/pw in the indicative. It's not; it's aorist. So I'm probably missing something.
"My sons here" is only tou/toisin, "these," in the Gr., but it seems clear that he's referring to someone close by, and since the discussion is about inheritance, his sons are the obvious choice.
In the sequel, we find out why S. asks C. about how he got his money.]
Tuesday, March 29, 2005
Cheapskates or Profligates?
I found out today that the department in which I am a graduate student is no longer providing gratis copies of the books required for the classes for which grad students TA. We don't have to buy our own copies, but we do have to turn in the copies given to us at the end of the term. The reason given was that publishers are refusing to provide desk copies each term, especially if the same text was used last term or even last year.
I suppose I shouldn't complain about not getting free books since I am not entitled to the books. But at the same time, it seems that if publishers have a policy of distributing a certain number of desk copies per number of students enrolled in the class, then the publishers should fulfill that promise. It's another question of whether the department should pass on the books to the TAs. I suppose it doesn't have to. However, I am dreading the state of affairs that will probably be realized in a few terms when I am given TA copies that have underlining and notes in pen, indiscriminate highlighting, and (gasp!) broken spines.
When I think about it, I'm glad that the only thing I really have to complain about is not getting free books. I have a beautiful wife, a nice place to live, employment, time to read Plato, freedom of religion, etc., etc.
I suppose I shouldn't complain about not getting free books since I am not entitled to the books. But at the same time, it seems that if publishers have a policy of distributing a certain number of desk copies per number of students enrolled in the class, then the publishers should fulfill that promise. It's another question of whether the department should pass on the books to the TAs. I suppose it doesn't have to. However, I am dreading the state of affairs that will probably be realized in a few terms when I am given TA copies that have underlining and notes in pen, indiscriminate highlighting, and (gasp!) broken spines.
When I think about it, I'm glad that the only thing I really have to complain about is not getting free books. I have a beautiful wife, a nice place to live, employment, time to read Plato, freedom of religion, etc., etc.
Thursday, March 24, 2005
A Theological Discovery?
"There are no sacraments on the Internet."
So says the Catholic bishop's conference of Peru. I find it a bit disheartening that the bishops needed to issue a statement on this point. Did someone actually think there were sacraments on the Internet?
So says the Catholic bishop's conference of Peru. I find it a bit disheartening that the bishops needed to issue a statement on this point. Did someone actually think there were sacraments on the Internet?
Attempting to Teach Ethics
Here is a summary of a recent exchange I had with a student in one of my ethics classes.
Me: Should people in the business world be honest even though it is thought that a majority of businessmen lie?
Student: Well, they won't make as much money that way.
Me: Perhaps, but ought they to tell the truth?
Student: Well, they probably don't want to tell the truth.
Me: Maybe, but ought they to tell the truth?
Student: Well, they might get caught if they lie.
Me: Yes, but ought they to tell the truth?
Student: Well, everyone else is pretty much lying most of the time.
Me: Yes, but ought they to tell the truth?
Student: Well, I'm not sure I would tell the truth.
Me: Yes, but ought you to tell the truth (putting aside extenuating circumstances)?
Student: I guess I don't get what you mean by "ought."
Me: I mean something you should do because it's the right thing to do.
Student: Well, what's right for some is different from what's right for others.
Me: Do you have a car?
Student: Yes.
Me: Would mind if another student in this class damaged your car?
Student: No.
Me: What if they think it's right for them to damage your car?
Student: Well, I don't think it's right.
Me: But what if they do?
Student: Well, I don't think it's right.
Me: So, you think that everyone should do what you think is right.
A few observations about this. (1) This student really had no clear conception of "ought." This seems to be worse than someone who just won't admit that they know they ought to do something but don't want to do it. He honestly seemed to lack a clear idea of what I meant when I asked him if he ought to do something. (2) At this point in the student's life, it will be nearly impossible to teach him ethics. Of course, I can "teach" him different ethical systems such as egoism, utilitarianism, or deontology, but he will probably never learn to be ethical.
Me: Should people in the business world be honest even though it is thought that a majority of businessmen lie?
Student: Well, they won't make as much money that way.
Me: Perhaps, but ought they to tell the truth?
Student: Well, they probably don't want to tell the truth.
Me: Maybe, but ought they to tell the truth?
Student: Well, they might get caught if they lie.
Me: Yes, but ought they to tell the truth?
Student: Well, everyone else is pretty much lying most of the time.
Me: Yes, but ought they to tell the truth?
Student: Well, I'm not sure I would tell the truth.
Me: Yes, but ought you to tell the truth (putting aside extenuating circumstances)?
Student: I guess I don't get what you mean by "ought."
Me: I mean something you should do because it's the right thing to do.
Student: Well, what's right for some is different from what's right for others.
Me: Do you have a car?
Student: Yes.
Me: Would mind if another student in this class damaged your car?
Student: No.
Me: What if they think it's right for them to damage your car?
Student: Well, I don't think it's right.
Me: But what if they do?
Student: Well, I don't think it's right.
Me: So, you think that everyone should do what you think is right.
A few observations about this. (1) This student really had no clear conception of "ought." This seems to be worse than someone who just won't admit that they know they ought to do something but don't want to do it. He honestly seemed to lack a clear idea of what I meant when I asked him if he ought to do something. (2) At this point in the student's life, it will be nearly impossible to teach him ethics. Of course, I can "teach" him different ethical systems such as egoism, utilitarianism, or deontology, but he will probably never learn to be ethical.
Tuesday, March 15, 2005
Forgiveness
"For if you forgive others their transgressions, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if you do not forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your transgressions" (Matt 6.14-15, from the gospel reading for the last Sunday before Lent, also called Forgiveness Sunday, in the eastern rite of the Orthodox Church).
I have lately wondered how the story of Genesis would change if Adam and Eve had forgiven each other on that tragic day in the garden. Would we still read the report of a son who murdered his brother out of envy and lied to cover it up? Would we hear of a world wiped out by floodwaters because of the wickedness of its inhabitants?
Perhaps Adam and Eve eventually did forgive each other. Perhaps they never learned how to forgive, nor how to ask forgiveness. There are surely many people today who do not know these things, including (all too frequently) myself. We all know how to apologize, of course; most of us learn how to say "I'm sorry" from an early age. But an apology of this sort often means something quite different than the words "will you forgive me." This can be illustrated by the ease with which "I'm sorry" is so often followed by "but..."
Imagine Adam and Eve apologizing to God:
"I'm sorry, God, but I just noticed that I was naked, and the woman..."
"I'm sorry, God, but that snake..."
There is another perspective: that of the person on the receiving end of the apology. In my own life I have observed that I have difficulty responding to an apology, sometimes even a simple one with no buts. Usually I say something like “it’s okay” when, in fact, “it” is not okay. All of this language is far too vague; it has the appearance of exonerating the sinner while implicitly justifying the sin.
The world we live in is no Eden, but what might it be like if God had simply said “it’s okay”? And – for our own sake and the sake of those around us – we ought to ask what the world might be like if Adam and Eve had asked for forgiveness rather than transferring their guilt to another. It is clear, at any rate, why they suddenly found a world of distance between themselves, and why they chose to hide from God. To say “will you forgive me” is to freely admit one’s guilt, to open oneself to another. Such vulnerability is difficult, which is probably why we tend to prefer apologizing to asking forgiveness.
So what has all this to do with Matt 6.14-15? It seems to me that this image of a stern father who offers only conditional forgiveness disappears when one considers the condition behind the condition. The person who is unwilling to forgive another quite likely avoids or refuses asking forgiveness of others. How can someone who does not admit their failures and shortcomings to another person sincerely ask forgiveness of God?
“…my king and Lord, let me look at my own sins and refrain from judging others: For you are bless'd unto ages of ages, amen” (from the prayer of St. Ephrem).
I have lately wondered how the story of Genesis would change if Adam and Eve had forgiven each other on that tragic day in the garden. Would we still read the report of a son who murdered his brother out of envy and lied to cover it up? Would we hear of a world wiped out by floodwaters because of the wickedness of its inhabitants?
Perhaps Adam and Eve eventually did forgive each other. Perhaps they never learned how to forgive, nor how to ask forgiveness. There are surely many people today who do not know these things, including (all too frequently) myself. We all know how to apologize, of course; most of us learn how to say "I'm sorry" from an early age. But an apology of this sort often means something quite different than the words "will you forgive me." This can be illustrated by the ease with which "I'm sorry" is so often followed by "but..."
Imagine Adam and Eve apologizing to God:
"I'm sorry, God, but I just noticed that I was naked, and the woman..."
"I'm sorry, God, but that snake..."
There is another perspective: that of the person on the receiving end of the apology. In my own life I have observed that I have difficulty responding to an apology, sometimes even a simple one with no buts. Usually I say something like “it’s okay” when, in fact, “it” is not okay. All of this language is far too vague; it has the appearance of exonerating the sinner while implicitly justifying the sin.
The world we live in is no Eden, but what might it be like if God had simply said “it’s okay”? And – for our own sake and the sake of those around us – we ought to ask what the world might be like if Adam and Eve had asked for forgiveness rather than transferring their guilt to another. It is clear, at any rate, why they suddenly found a world of distance between themselves, and why they chose to hide from God. To say “will you forgive me” is to freely admit one’s guilt, to open oneself to another. Such vulnerability is difficult, which is probably why we tend to prefer apologizing to asking forgiveness.
So what has all this to do with Matt 6.14-15? It seems to me that this image of a stern father who offers only conditional forgiveness disappears when one considers the condition behind the condition. The person who is unwilling to forgive another quite likely avoids or refuses asking forgiveness of others. How can someone who does not admit their failures and shortcomings to another person sincerely ask forgiveness of God?
“…my king and Lord, let me look at my own sins and refrain from judging others: For you are bless'd unto ages of ages, amen” (from the prayer of St. Ephrem).
Friday, March 11, 2005
Quotable
Working one of my day jobs as editor for a philosophy journal, I came across the following sentence.
Membership in the Trinity has its privileges.
Membership in the Trinity has its privileges.
Wednesday, March 09, 2005
A Byzantine Speaks
From Procopius, Buildings:
[Describing a person entering Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, after a lengthy description of the building and its construction]
"And whenever anyone enters this church to pray, he understands at once that it is not by any human power or skill, but by the influence of God, that this work has been so finely turned. And so his mind is lifted up toward God and exalted, believing that He cannot be far away, but must especially love to dwell in this place which He has chosen. And this does not happen only to one who sees the church for the first time, but the same experience comes to him on each successive occassion, as thought the sight were new each time."
I have two thoughts on this. The first is academic: Procopius is emphasizing the Emperor's nearness to God throughout the Buildings. It is the essence of his project, and as Hagia Sophia is the starting point for his work, and is also a divinily appointed building by a divinely appointed Emperor, when we notice the nearness of God, in Hagia Sophia, we are noticing His nearness through the medium of the Emperor who has in a very real sense, revealed Him for us. I'm going to leave that as it is.
The second is to believe that perhaps this statement could also be taken at face value, as a genuine expression of piety; Byzantine rhetoric does not exclude personal sentiment. The sentiment expressed is not one usually associated with "late antique religion;" it would not be used in a paradigm for Byzantine Christianity, and her emphasis on the nearness of God (I don't think hardly anyone in the history department has ever thought to emphasize that). Perhaps it should.
Of course, a Western Christian today who walked into the same building would probably be overwhelmed by God's distance. Which is more important to have as the basic paradigm -- to insist on God the ineffable, or Jesus lover of my soul? In any case it is refreshing to enter, if only for a moment, into the world of a man who is inspired anew by God's nearness, as we search desparately for something to awaken in us a sense of God's otherness. A balance must be struck, for in the end this is simply the mystery of the incarnation revisited. Jesus who wept with women at the death of his friend is the same rider on the pale horse with all hell following behind him. However, I think that the divinity of Christ (and therefore the absolute holiness of God) must be the starting point: the incarnation is no mystery if you start (theologically) with the babe already born.
[Describing a person entering Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, after a lengthy description of the building and its construction]
"And whenever anyone enters this church to pray, he understands at once that it is not by any human power or skill, but by the influence of God, that this work has been so finely turned. And so his mind is lifted up toward God and exalted, believing that He cannot be far away, but must especially love to dwell in this place which He has chosen. And this does not happen only to one who sees the church for the first time, but the same experience comes to him on each successive occassion, as thought the sight were new each time."
I have two thoughts on this. The first is academic: Procopius is emphasizing the Emperor's nearness to God throughout the Buildings. It is the essence of his project, and as Hagia Sophia is the starting point for his work, and is also a divinily appointed building by a divinely appointed Emperor, when we notice the nearness of God, in Hagia Sophia, we are noticing His nearness through the medium of the Emperor who has in a very real sense, revealed Him for us. I'm going to leave that as it is.
The second is to believe that perhaps this statement could also be taken at face value, as a genuine expression of piety; Byzantine rhetoric does not exclude personal sentiment. The sentiment expressed is not one usually associated with "late antique religion;" it would not be used in a paradigm for Byzantine Christianity, and her emphasis on the nearness of God (I don't think hardly anyone in the history department has ever thought to emphasize that). Perhaps it should.
Of course, a Western Christian today who walked into the same building would probably be overwhelmed by God's distance. Which is more important to have as the basic paradigm -- to insist on God the ineffable, or Jesus lover of my soul? In any case it is refreshing to enter, if only for a moment, into the world of a man who is inspired anew by God's nearness, as we search desparately for something to awaken in us a sense of God's otherness. A balance must be struck, for in the end this is simply the mystery of the incarnation revisited. Jesus who wept with women at the death of his friend is the same rider on the pale horse with all hell following behind him. However, I think that the divinity of Christ (and therefore the absolute holiness of God) must be the starting point: the incarnation is no mystery if you start (theologically) with the babe already born.
The Manolo
At right, on the list of places to burgle, you will find a link to the Manolo. I first linked to Manolo because of his lighthearted comments about fashion, particularly shoes. Recently, prompted by Martha Stewart's implicit endorsement of the poncho, Manolo posted the following:
The Manolo No-Poncho Pledge
"I (insert the name here) swear on the head and/or the grave of my sainted granny to never wear, buy, knit, crochet, or fashion from the old throw rug, the poncho. And if the poncho it is given to me as the gift, I will graciously thank the giver and then, when she has left, put the poncho into the dog's bed and/or the trash as the case she may be. Only by doing these things faithfully can I help end for the good of the humanity the scourge that is the poncho. So help me Manolo."
Then I noticed Manolo is reading the greatest mystery novel ever written.
And also, Manolo posted some very thoughtful comments on modesty and what is valuable and worth pursuing in life.
I promise a post on Plato/Republic soon.
The Manolo No-Poncho Pledge
"I (insert the name here) swear on the head and/or the grave of my sainted granny to never wear, buy, knit, crochet, or fashion from the old throw rug, the poncho. And if the poncho it is given to me as the gift, I will graciously thank the giver and then, when she has left, put the poncho into the dog's bed and/or the trash as the case she may be. Only by doing these things faithfully can I help end for the good of the humanity the scourge that is the poncho. So help me Manolo."
Then I noticed Manolo is reading the greatest mystery novel ever written.
And also, Manolo posted some very thoughtful comments on modesty and what is valuable and worth pursuing in life.
I promise a post on Plato/Republic soon.
Tuesday, March 08, 2005
Blog Game & New Burglar
Everybody:
There is a new blogger here at the Bourgeois Burglars. Please welcome Le Complice, whose first post is below.
Perhaps you've seen this circulating in the blogosphere. I've decided to play.
1. Grab the nearest book.
2. Open the book to page 123.
3. Find the fifth sentence.
4. Post the text of the sentence in your journal along with these instructions.
5. Dont search around and look for the "coolest" book you can find. Do what's actually next to you.
Well, there are a number of books next to me, but this is the one I grabbed (and, okay, I was motivated a bit by the "cool" factor).
He [the "Guardian" in Plato's Republic] hates him whom he does not know, not for some wrong he has previously suffered from him, but for the very fact of his ignorance of him; just as he loves him whom he knows, not for some kindness he has previously received from him, but for the very fact of his knowledge of him. (From Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic, corr. ed., trans. E.I.J. Rosenthal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).)
It's like the "six degrees" game, only smarter.
(HT: Brian Leiter)
There is a new blogger here at the Bourgeois Burglars. Please welcome Le Complice, whose first post is below.
Perhaps you've seen this circulating in the blogosphere. I've decided to play.
1. Grab the nearest book.
2. Open the book to page 123.
3. Find the fifth sentence.
4. Post the text of the sentence in your journal along with these instructions.
5. Dont search around and look for the "coolest" book you can find. Do what's actually next to you.
Well, there are a number of books next to me, but this is the one I grabbed (and, okay, I was motivated a bit by the "cool" factor).
He [the "Guardian" in Plato's Republic] hates him whom he does not know, not for some wrong he has previously suffered from him, but for the very fact of his ignorance of him; just as he loves him whom he knows, not for some kindness he has previously received from him, but for the very fact of his knowledge of him. (From Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic, corr. ed., trans. E.I.J. Rosenthal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).)
It's like the "six degrees" game, only smarter.
(HT: Brian Leiter)
WWJB?
Greetings fellow Burglars, jurors, and eyewitnesses (friends, Romans, countrymen?) . In my inaugural blog I thought I'd drop a bomb, of sorts, or at least comment on the dropping of bombs and other related acts of military violence. I recently saw a bumper sticker that asked the question "Who Would Jesus Bomb?" While it is an amusing riff on the ubiquitous (in some circles) WWJD theme, it also implies a critique of Christians who might see no irony in a bomber with the words "Jesus is my co-pilot" plastered on its hull. If the results of our recent presidential election are any indication, such Christians would seem to represent a sizeable number. Perhaps that's why we all saw maps of our country covered in red.
Now I live in a "blue state," and I've been a graduate student at what can only be described as a blue university (in more ways than one); these things have undoubtedly influenced my politics. Yet I cannot help but be struck by similarities between the rhetoric of ancient generals who defeated "tyrants" and brought "liberty" to Rome, and the rhetoric of a President who has declared a "war on terror" and brought "democracy" to Iraq. Terrorists are, of course, tyrants; the weapon they use to advance their tyranny is fear. But they cannot, and will not be overcome by machine guns, tanks, and bombs – even bombs with crosses painted on them and the legend "by this sign, conquer." Neither does the freedom we experience as Christians have anything to do with the form of government under which we live. Only when we recognize that there is no fear in love will we be free from tyranny, whether it is the tyranny of ideologically vacuous notions of "liberty" and "democracy" or the tyranny of terror.
I recognize that individuals and nations are often faced with difficult choices, and I am not a pacifist of the "egoistically vegetarian" sort described by Mother Maria (recently canonized Orthodox saint). But in the midst of all the rhetoric that is flying around, a crucial message has been obscured. As members of a church that claims as its Lord and Savior a man who was ignominiously put to death on a Roman cross, we are faced with a choice: we can take up our cross, or we can take up the hammer and nails.
Now I live in a "blue state," and I've been a graduate student at what can only be described as a blue university (in more ways than one); these things have undoubtedly influenced my politics. Yet I cannot help but be struck by similarities between the rhetoric of ancient generals who defeated "tyrants" and brought "liberty" to Rome, and the rhetoric of a President who has declared a "war on terror" and brought "democracy" to Iraq. Terrorists are, of course, tyrants; the weapon they use to advance their tyranny is fear. But they cannot, and will not be overcome by machine guns, tanks, and bombs – even bombs with crosses painted on them and the legend "by this sign, conquer." Neither does the freedom we experience as Christians have anything to do with the form of government under which we live. Only when we recognize that there is no fear in love will we be free from tyranny, whether it is the tyranny of ideologically vacuous notions of "liberty" and "democracy" or the tyranny of terror.
I recognize that individuals and nations are often faced with difficult choices, and I am not a pacifist of the "egoistically vegetarian" sort described by Mother Maria (recently canonized Orthodox saint). But in the midst of all the rhetoric that is flying around, a crucial message has been obscured. As members of a church that claims as its Lord and Savior a man who was ignominiously put to death on a Roman cross, we are faced with a choice: we can take up our cross, or we can take up the hammer and nails.
Sunday, March 06, 2005
Checkpoint Tragedy
The death of Nicola Calipari (the Italian secret service agent) while helping Giuliana Sgrena (the kidnapped Italian journalist) get out of Iraq is horrible.
That said, the comments by Sgrena in utter rejection of the U.S. explanation (that they were speeding despite US soldiers yelling and flashing lights) to me seems a bit disingenuous:
"Sgrena, who works for the communist daily Il Manifesto, did not rule out that she was targeted, saying the United States likely disapproved of Italy's methods to secure her release, although she did not elaborate."
" 'The fact that the Americans don't want negotiations to free the hostages is known,' Sgrena told Sky TG24 television by telephone, her voice hoarse and shaky. 'The fact that they do everything to prevent the adoption of this practice to save the lives of people held hostages, everybody knows that. So I don't see why I should rule out that I could have been the target.' "
A description of the incident leading to Calipari's death, on the way to the airport:
" 'I remember only fire,' she wrote in Il Manifesto, which fiercely opposed the war in Iraq. 'At that point a rain of fire and bullets came at us, forever silencing the happy voices from a few minutes earlier.' Sgrena said the driver began shouting that they were Italian, then 'Nicola Calipari dove on top of me to protect me and immediately, and I mean immediately, I felt his last breath as he died on me.' Suddenly, she said, she remembered her captors' words, when they warned her 'to be careful because the Americans don't want you to return.' " Sgrena wrote that her captors warned her as she was about to be released not to signal her presence to anyone, because 'the Americans might intervene.' "
Again, it is a horrible event, but this was obviously also traumatic in the extreme for the woman: could she be jumping to conclusions? that the US deliberately wanted her taken out for her governments tactics of rescuing prisoners??? Call me naively patriotic: I'm sorry, Guiliana, I want to believe you and I think you must have had an awful time and deserve all of your nation's and ours' congratulations and rewards for your bravery, but I simply cannot believe that the US is trying to keep the few allies it has by shooting them when they use a different set of policies for hostage rescue.
What seemed to me the most sensible piece to come out of the whole affair was this one in the Christian Science Monitor by Annia Ciezadlo: well worth the read. [Look at this one too.] Given Annia's comments, could it be that the advice Guiliana was given by her captors led to the US's misinterpretation of her vehicle's behavior? Could it be that this was the captors' intention??? Nah, couldn't possibly. Memo to self: when in hostage situation, always listen to what captors say: they have your best interests in mind.
Thank you, Annia, for rising above the chance to sling a fist of mud at public enemy of your choice and instead helping those of us who are sitting at home sipping a latte in slippers make some sense of the situation -- it stinks and doesn't make sense.
Go journalism, go!
That said, the comments by Sgrena in utter rejection of the U.S. explanation (that they were speeding despite US soldiers yelling and flashing lights) to me seems a bit disingenuous:
"Sgrena, who works for the communist daily Il Manifesto, did not rule out that she was targeted, saying the United States likely disapproved of Italy's methods to secure her release, although she did not elaborate."
" 'The fact that the Americans don't want negotiations to free the hostages is known,' Sgrena told Sky TG24 television by telephone, her voice hoarse and shaky. 'The fact that they do everything to prevent the adoption of this practice to save the lives of people held hostages, everybody knows that. So I don't see why I should rule out that I could have been the target.' "
A description of the incident leading to Calipari's death, on the way to the airport:
" 'I remember only fire,' she wrote in Il Manifesto, which fiercely opposed the war in Iraq. 'At that point a rain of fire and bullets came at us, forever silencing the happy voices from a few minutes earlier.' Sgrena said the driver began shouting that they were Italian, then 'Nicola Calipari dove on top of me to protect me and immediately, and I mean immediately, I felt his last breath as he died on me.' Suddenly, she said, she remembered her captors' words, when they warned her 'to be careful because the Americans don't want you to return.' " Sgrena wrote that her captors warned her as she was about to be released not to signal her presence to anyone, because 'the Americans might intervene.' "
Again, it is a horrible event, but this was obviously also traumatic in the extreme for the woman: could she be jumping to conclusions? that the US deliberately wanted her taken out for her governments tactics of rescuing prisoners??? Call me naively patriotic: I'm sorry, Guiliana, I want to believe you and I think you must have had an awful time and deserve all of your nation's and ours' congratulations and rewards for your bravery, but I simply cannot believe that the US is trying to keep the few allies it has by shooting them when they use a different set of policies for hostage rescue.
What seemed to me the most sensible piece to come out of the whole affair was this one in the Christian Science Monitor by Annia Ciezadlo: well worth the read. [Look at this one too.] Given Annia's comments, could it be that the advice Guiliana was given by her captors led to the US's misinterpretation of her vehicle's behavior? Could it be that this was the captors' intention??? Nah, couldn't possibly. Memo to self: when in hostage situation, always listen to what captors say: they have your best interests in mind.
Thank you, Annia, for rising above the chance to sling a fist of mud at public enemy of your choice and instead helping those of us who are sitting at home sipping a latte in slippers make some sense of the situation -- it stinks and doesn't make sense.
Go journalism, go!
Friday, March 04, 2005
A Note on Sedley on Plato's "Development"
From David Sedley, Plato's Cratylus:
There have been some recent proposals to jettison this whole chronological structure [of the development of Plato's thought], but in my view they represent, so far at least, little more than the understandable fact that people are getting bored with it. There is actually much to lose if we say goodbye to it. For by reading Plato's development along the lines I have summarised, we are enabled to understand how the youthful admirer of the maverick critic Socrates became in time the teacher of Aristotle and the august founder of a metaphysical system which was to dominate philosophy for the last half-millennium of antiquity and well beyond. (7)
The problem with this argument is that it mistakes the assumptions underwriting this kind of chronology for the conclusions it provides. The "development" theory of Plato's philosophy assumes that Plato developed from an admirer of Socrates into a full-blown metaphysician who bequeathed to Aristotle, among others, explanations and problems Socrates did not conceive of. In order for the development theory to be plausible, it has to assume a development.
Now when Sedley states that "by reading Plato's development along the lines I have summarised, we are enabled to understand how the youthful admirer of Socrates . . ." he is mistaking the conclusion of the development theory for its assumption. The only way the development theory "enable[s]" us to understand Plato's development is by assuming that Plato's thought developed.
But what if Plato's thought did not develop? What if, per Schleiermacher, Shorey, Kahn et al., Plato's philosophy stayed pretty much the same from the beginning of his philosophical career to the end? Call this the "stasis" theory. Now suppose I said something like what Sedley says, only in favor of the stasis theory: "By reading Plato's largely unchanging philosophical outlook in the ways suggested by Schleiermacher et al., we are enabled to understand how Plato arranged his dialogues in such a way that it only appears to the reader of his corpus that his thinking changed."
I do not know which of the basic hypotheses about Plato's development (or lack thereof) is correct, but it seems clear that the development hypothesis has become so dominant in Plato scholarship that its assumptions are being mistaken for its conclusions.
There have been some recent proposals to jettison this whole chronological structure [of the development of Plato's thought], but in my view they represent, so far at least, little more than the understandable fact that people are getting bored with it. There is actually much to lose if we say goodbye to it. For by reading Plato's development along the lines I have summarised, we are enabled to understand how the youthful admirer of the maverick critic Socrates became in time the teacher of Aristotle and the august founder of a metaphysical system which was to dominate philosophy for the last half-millennium of antiquity and well beyond. (7)
The problem with this argument is that it mistakes the assumptions underwriting this kind of chronology for the conclusions it provides. The "development" theory of Plato's philosophy assumes that Plato developed from an admirer of Socrates into a full-blown metaphysician who bequeathed to Aristotle, among others, explanations and problems Socrates did not conceive of. In order for the development theory to be plausible, it has to assume a development.
Now when Sedley states that "by reading Plato's development along the lines I have summarised, we are enabled to understand how the youthful admirer of Socrates . . ." he is mistaking the conclusion of the development theory for its assumption. The only way the development theory "enable[s]" us to understand Plato's development is by assuming that Plato's thought developed.
But what if Plato's thought did not develop? What if, per Schleiermacher, Shorey, Kahn et al., Plato's philosophy stayed pretty much the same from the beginning of his philosophical career to the end? Call this the "stasis" theory. Now suppose I said something like what Sedley says, only in favor of the stasis theory: "By reading Plato's largely unchanging philosophical outlook in the ways suggested by Schleiermacher et al., we are enabled to understand how Plato arranged his dialogues in such a way that it only appears to the reader of his corpus that his thinking changed."
I do not know which of the basic hypotheses about Plato's development (or lack thereof) is correct, but it seems clear that the development hypothesis has become so dominant in Plato scholarship that its assumptions are being mistaken for its conclusions.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)