Showing posts with label Plato. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Plato. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

Eye Exam: Timaeus 28a-b

The most difficult test of vision
Is to see that which cannot be seen.
I tell you, and so too will St. Paul,
To look -- There! -- for the unseen thing, which
is not the clear water only seen
through nor the aim of the basilisk
stare now fixed by time’s moving image.

“Tell me:
Better one, two, about the same?
Better three, four, about the same?
Now look at that and tell me what you see.”

“T, O, K, A, T, A, T, A, U, T, A, E, CH, O, N.”

Beautifully done.

Monday, April 21, 2008

Awesome, Awesomer, Awesomest

Q: You know what's awesome?
A: That the full Greek text of Proclus's commentary on Plato's Timaeus is available online at Google Books.

Q: You know what would be awesomer?
A: If I could read it faster than ten lines per hour.

Q: You know what would be awesomest?
A: If the anonymous commentary on Plato's Theaetetus were also available online.

Saturday, April 12, 2008

In My Opinion: Timaeus 27d-28a

The bloom of what in every way is and the
almost flash of what comes to be must
always be the most different, must almost

come to be in all ways different.
The flash, born to be seen by the eyes alone;
the bloom, unbegotten, is unseen.

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Menexenus

John Mark Reynolds writes (way down at the end of his post):
I will admit I can get little or nothing out of Menexenus other than Plato making the point that statesmen often make horrifically tedious speeches in the name of patriotism. This is true, but one doubts Plato’s genius was need to demonstrate it.

Hmm. I would have thought the point of the Menexenus is that Socrates can ape the speeches of the politician spectacularly well. And one point of doing it "spectacularly" is that the philosopher does it in such a way that the politician doesn't know he's being mocked; he thinks the philosopher is doing a dull impression of the politician. What he doesn't realize is that the philosopher is giving an accurate impression of the politician, which the politician takes to be dull. The dullness of the politician is due to his neglect of two things: justice and the divine. (Collins and Stauffer make this point in their introduction to their translation of the dialogue.)

Whether this amounts to more than what Reynolds has noticed is an open question.

Saturday, March 29, 2008

Menu: Timaeus 27a-b

For the first course:
a mix of
opinions
on the cosmos,
humankind,
and everything
else, prepared
by our best
gastronomer.

The second course
(eaten first),
is an ideal
blend of justice
and the good
on a Bed of
education.

The third course,
which can't be
finished, makes
men of us all.

Don't forget
to say grace.

Friday, March 28, 2008

In Which on Reading a Passage from the Republic I Get Teary-eyed

The passage in question is 608d. Here is Bloom's translation:

"Haven't you perceived," I said, "that our soul is immortal and is never destroyed?"

And he looked me in the face with wonder and said, "No, by Zeus, I haven't. Can you say that?"

Sunday, March 23, 2008

Atlantis: Timaeus 20c–26e

Truth is strange, not just stranger than fiction,
But a good story is a goodly store
Of truth when heard from a friend of a friend.
A good story—beginning, middle, end—
Makes philosophers kings, but no rhetor
Here looks so good and speaks with a diction
Sufficient to get around the truth of
The matter: Only in the olden days
Were men so good with laws to make stories
Out of them. One of Numenor’s glories,
So the myth goes, taught that he who obeys
Pleases the gods and those whom the gods love.

Sunday, March 16, 2008

How Not to Start a Party: Timaeus 17a–20c

When one of us misses the feast, the others must pick up the slack in proportion and fill in what’s now left out. When one of us happens to miss, I’m sure the guest host says to himself, “Well, now, this is awkward.” And the reputable etiquette guides all counsel never to count on proportions turning out the way we know they should. But how one could know all this at the beginning, is not easy for two or three to say.

“Did you all remember your assignments?” is not what I want to hear at a party. And then, afterward, my friend asks, “What kind of party was it, anyway?” But there I was, the life of it. If I were someone else, I’d want to shoot myself for that.

When the conversation turns to politics: We all know what the etiquette guides say about that (even the disreputable ones agree): “Subtly turn the conversation to something more suitable.” Are there any good movies you’d like to see? A war movie? My, I didn’t think you were into those sorts of things.

(Take my advice: A languishing party, like a sleeping tiger at the zoo—not the sort of thing to engender much enthusiasm. Best at that point to start drinking or leave. Whatever happens next, won’t be worth remembering.)

An Occasional Series

I'm going to start an occasional series of poems inspired by Plato's Timaeus. The first entry follows. (Caveat lector: No one said it will be good poetry.)

Wednesday, March 05, 2008

Books

Kelly tagged me.

(1) One book that changed your life. Plato's Timaeus
(2) One book that you have read more than once. Plato's Timaeus
(3) One book you would want on a desert island (besides the Bible). Plato's Timaeus
(4) Two books that made you laugh. Plato's Timaeus and Ion
(5) One book that made you cry. Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows
(6) One book you wish you'd written. Plato's Timaeus
(7) One book you wish had never been written. Aristotle's Physics
(8) Two books you are currently reading. Plato's Republic, Richard Swinburne's The Coherence of Theism
(9) One book you've been meaning to read. Plato's Laws

***For the 1-2-3 meme, the directions are:
(1) Pick up the nearest book (of at least 123 pages).
(2) Open the book to page 123.
(3) Find the fifth sentence.
(4) Post the next three sentences.
(5) Tag five people.

The nearest book is Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It's a bilingual edition, so I'll give you the English version of the requested sentences on page 123 (trans. G.E.M. Anscombe):
There is a related case (though perhaps it will not seem so) when, for example, we (Germans) are surprised that in French the predicative adjective agrees with the substantive in gender, and when we explain it to ourselves by saying: they mean: "the man is a good one."

I won't tag anyone, but I'll ask whether anyone sees the Timaeus joke in the rules for the 1-2-3 meme.

Tuesday, February 05, 2008

A Nice Description of the Difficulties of Interpreting Plato Correctly

The interpretive problem emphasized here is the tension between demands for systematic meaning and the unresolved variety of Plato's thought. This opposition is invited by hints of unity on the one hand and by diverse manifestations of the philosophy--apparent contradictions and seeming gaps--on the other. The latter are aggravated by the indirections of the dialogue form, by exposition through differing speakers, and by electing variously mythic, dramatic, logistic, and poetic modes of presentation.


From William Sacksteder's review of E. N. Tiegerstedt's Interpreting Plato, a book I discussed back in the day.

Friday, June 29, 2007

A "Post" While on Vacation

From St. Augustine, The City of God, book 11, chapter 25 (trans. Dyson):

. . . the philosophers have wished to divide their discipline into three parts (or, rather, were enabled to see that there is such a threefold division; for they did not invent it, but only discovered it): of which one part is called physical, another logical and the third ethical. . . .

. . . . Plato, however, is said to have been the first to discover and recommend this division, and he saw that only God could be the author of nature, the giver of intelligence and the inspirer of the love by which life is made good and blessed. Also, it is certain that, though opinions differ as to the nature of things, and the method of investigating truth, and the good to which we ough to refer all that we do, it is to these three great and general questions that all the efforts of the philosophers are devoted. Thus, though there is much disagreement as to which view each man ought to take in respect of any of these questions, no one doubts that nature has some cause, science some method, and life some purpose.

Thursday, June 21, 2007

On What Can Be Beautiful

Aristotle, in Poetics, says, "the beautiful is in both the magnitude and the arrangement. Wherefore neither the very small should become a beautiful animal (for since the vision [of it] occurs in a nearly unfelt extent of time it is confused) nor should the very large (for the vision [of it] does not happen all at the same time, but the single and whole thing is gone from the vision of those who see it, if, for example, the animal should be a thousand stades long)" (1450b35ff, Thorgerson trans.).

In Plato's Timaeus, Timaeus says that the cosmos is beautiful: it is the "most beautiful of things born" (29a); the god "joined together the all so that he had fashioned a work that would be most beautiful and best in accordance with nature" (30b); and "the god wanted to make it as similar as possible to the most beautiful of things grasped by the intellect" (30d-31a).

Now I take it that the cosmos counts as a very large object. So is Aristotle disagreeing with Plato/Timaeus on this matter?

But there's more. Timaeus says that the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) are "preeminent in beauty" (53e). Naturally, these elements are very, very small (though not the smallest of things). So now Plato/Timaeus seems to also be disagreeing with Aristotle about the possibility that small things can be beautiful.

I'll look in Aristotle's De Caelo to see if he makes similar comments about the universe.

But now I wonder who's right? We might say that pace Aristotle, microorganisms are beautiful. But our saying this depends upon looking at them through a microscope, by which a larger image of the organism appears to us. So is the microorganism beautiful, or just its larger image?

Similarly for the universe. We often say that the universe is beautiful. But don't we just mean that an image (usually a picture) of some region of the universe is beautiful?

Plato's way out: Defend the position that what is most beautiful is not visible.

Monday, June 04, 2007

Quotation on a Work of Plato's

"The Lysis is hard. The Theory of Forms doesn't make it any easier."

--R. M. Dancy, Plato's Introduction of Forms, p. 206.

Monday, December 18, 2006

Platonic Solids

Have hours of fun!

This is part of a Web page for a really interesting conference. There's added incentive (is "added incentive" redundant?) to attend: a $50 prize will be awarded to the person who comes up with the "best original joke involving a triangle, square, or Platonic solid." (Think I'm joking? Check out their space.) So, a triangle, a square, and a Platonic solid walk into a bar . . . .

Wednesday, August 02, 2006

Meno 72b-d

I started my translation of this dialogue a while ago. I've already posted some of it here, here, and here. Here's the next installment.

Socrates: Indeed, I seem to have furnished myself with some great fortune, Meno, if by my inquiring into virtue I have discovered some beehive of virtues lying near you. But, Meno, going with this image about the beehive, if after I asked about a bee, concerning [its] being (ousia), [b] what it is (pot’ estin), you said them1 to be of many and of all kinds, what would you answer me, if I asked you, "Are you declaring there to be many, of all kinds, and different from one another? Or in this2 do they differ in nothing, but [they differ] with respect to other things -- beauty or size or another of these things?" Speak, how would you answer having been asked?

Meno: I would say this, that they differ in nothing (they are bees) the one from the other.3

[c] Socrates: If then I were to say after that, "Now tell me just this, Meno: By what4 do they differ in nothing but are entirely (apasai) identical (tauton)? What do you declare this to be?" You'd have, perhaps, something to tell me?

Meno: Indeed.

Socrates: Thus indeed, concerning virtues, too. Even if they are many and all kinds, they have some form (eidov) entirely (apasai) identical (tauton) by which they are virtues, by which perhaps the person answering, having looked to [it] beautifully, is to make visible to the one asking what he hit upon [namely,] [d] the being of virtue. Or do you not understand (manqaneiv) what I’m saying?


Notes

1. autav: pl. fem. acc; the plural number is a bit odd because Socrates (in answering his own question!) began with the singular (a bee) and switches to plural (themselves, them). But note that if Socrates had been consistent in his number, his question either would not be coherent ("if I asked you about a bee, would you say it is of many and all kinds?") or as clear ("if I asked you about bees, would you say they are many and of all kinds?").

2. toutwi: sing. masc. dat, the antecedent is unclear; is it ousia? To back up a little, Socrates says, "if I asked you to tell me about the being of a bee, and you said they (see note 1) were all different, then I might ask you if you meant they were all different, but they are not different in this but in some other way." What is Socrates referring to when he says "in this"? Or is there no direct antecedent?

3. This translation is awkward. Most translators opt to treat the phrase hi melittai eisin playing the role of "qua bees." But that seems to be add too much to the text; this is, after all, Meno’s speech, and I am not convinced he has grasped the concept expressed by "qua."

4. Sing. masc. dat. of ov, taken in an instrumental way; note the singular number corresponds to the second question What do you declare this to be? Not to lean on the grammar too much, but already it is clear Socrates is looking for one thing in virtue of which the same things are all alike.

Thursday, June 29, 2006

Thoughts on JKR

(1) Rowling said recently that two characters will die in the final Harry Potter novel. All fine and good. I want to know if any of them will come back to life.

(2) While reading Plato's Phaedrus to prepare to lead some discussions on it, I came across this passage:

For the prophetess in Delphi and the priestesses in Dodona when mad have accomplished many beautiful things for Greece both in private and in public, but little, or rather nothing, when of sound mind. And if we should speak of the Sibyl and others, who used divinely inspired prophesy to foretell in the future many things to many people and guide them aright, we would draw it [our speech] out at length, saying things that are clear to everyone. (244a-b, trans. Nichols)

Is this description not a deadringer for Trelawny? What was her first name again? Sibyl? I also wonder if Trelawny's penchant for sherry is based on her desire to lose herself in something other than herself so that she may prophesy. For she does not prophesy under her own power, but only when influenced by . . . ? What? God?

I've thought for a while now that the only thing in Harry Potter's world that is truly supernatural is prophecy. What about the magic, you say? Two things about the magic make it not so easily supernatural: it has to be learned by great study (that is why the students are at Hogwarts) and a fully developed natural science would be indistinguishable from magic. (Here I could throw in some quotation from Lewis's Abolition of Man about how magic and science both spring from the same desire, but you already know all that. But consider anyway this article describing how scientists will probably make something like Harry's invisibility cloak.)

John Granger has written a wonderful article on Harry Potter. Everyone should read it, especially critics. Among other things, the article points out in various places the tenuous nature of our understanding of the distinction between natural and supernatural. What is it to be supernatural? Is alchemy natural or not?

One thing I would add to his article is a mention of the existence of prophecy in the books. I think it is one of the clearest indicators Rowling's world is supernatural. And immersing ourselves in that world is indeed a powerful ally in helping us to live "fully human, which is to say 'spiritual,' lives" (Granger, last para.).

Thursday, February 09, 2006

In Which Manolo Sees That Agathon Was Wrong

Manolo says, ". . . the designers of the Project Runway, they are not the handsome peoples. This it is not the handicap in the world of fashion, as it is also true that many of the famous fashion designers, they too are ugly. The Manolo, he theorizes that this it is because the ugly they are naturally drawn to the beauty."

Plato in his Symposium (201a-c, trans. Benardete) creates the following dialogue between Socrates and the playwright Agathon:

"And if this is so, Eros would be nothing else than love of beauty, but not of ugliness?" He [Agathon] agreed.

"Hasn't it been agreed that that of which one is in need and does not have one loves?"

"Yes," he said.

"So Eros is in need of and does not have beauty."

"Of necessity," he said.

"What about this? That which is in need of beauty and in no way possesses beauty, do you say that it is beautiful?"

"Certainly not."

"Do you still agree then that Eros is beautiful, if this is so?"

And Agathon said, "It's probable, Socrates, that I knew nothing of what I had said."

"And yet spoke you beautifully, Agathon," he said.


So the fashion designers of which Manolo speaks are in the same boat as the god Eros: they are both in love with beautiful things because they themselves are ugly.

Saturday, February 04, 2006

Meno 70c-72a

Here's a longish passage from my translation of the Meno. It begins in the middle of a speech by Socrates.

But here, friend Meno, it has turned out the opposite. It’s as though there has been some drought of wisdom, and it’s possible [71a] for wisdom to have gone from these places to yours. At any rate, if you wish to ask someone here about this, there is no one who will not laugh and say, “Stranger, it’s possible I seem to you to be someone blessed -- at any rate, to know whether virtue is taught or what manner it comes to be -- but I stand very much in need of knowing whether virtue is taught or not taught, and am not as one who happens at all to know what virtue is.”

[b] So I, Meno, am even one such as this; I am poor with my fellow citizens about this matter, and I find great fault with myself thus, not knowing about virtue at all. But if I do not know what a thing is, how do I know what sort of thing it really* is? Or does it seem to you to to be like this: if anyone does not learn to know at all who Meno is, this one’s to know whether [Meno] is beautiful or rich or even well-born, or the opposite of these? Does it seem to you to be thus?

Meno: Not to me. But you, Socrates, do you truly [c] not know what virtue is, and is this what we’re to report about you back home?

Socrates: Not only this, comrade, but also that I have not met another who it seems to me did know.

Meno: What then? Did you not meet Gorgias when he was here?

Socrates: I did indeed.

Meno: Then he seemed not to you to know?

Socrates: I am not entirely mindful,** Meno, so I am not able to say in present circumstances how it seemed to me then. But it’s equally possible he does know, and that you know what he spoke; so remind [d] me how he spoke. And if you wish say yourself, for doubtless it seems to you however [it seemed] to him.

Meno: To me, yes indeed.

Socrates: Therefore, let’s be done with him, since he is not here, but you yourself, by the gods, Meno, what do you declare virtue to be? Speak and do not be grudging so that I will have fabricated a most fortunate lie if you and Gorgias, as ones who know, were to bring it to light, though I’ve stated I never yet have met with one who knows.

[e] Meno: But it’s not difficult, Socrates, to say. First then, if you wish, the virtue of a man, it’s easy; this is the virtue of a man: to be competent to manage the city, managing to do good to friends and harm to enemies, and himself taking care not to suffer any such thing. But if you wish the virtue of a woman, it’s not difficult to go through: she must economize the household, both preserving what is in the home and listening to the man. And there is also virtue of a child, both female and male, and of the old man, if you wish, of the free, or if you wish, [72a] of the slave. And there are very many other virtues, so that there is no impasse to speaking about what virtue is. For according to each of the practices and stages of life there is a virtue for each work of each of us. And I suppose it’s like this, Socrates, for badness, too.


Notes:
* Including “really” because of the force of “an . . . ge . . .” Or perhaps it should read, “how do I really know what sort of thing it is”?
** Chosen instead of the usual “I’m rather forgetful” or some such to bring out the continuing ambiguity of “entirely,” “at all,” etc. (cf. to parapon at 71b3 and 71b5). I.e., does Socrates not remember at all, or does he just not remember all of it?

Tuesday, January 24, 2006

Meno 70a-c

In response to Meno's opening question, Socrates says,

Meno, before now the Thessalians were famous among the Greeks and honored for horsemanship and for wealth, but now, it seems to me, [they are to be honored] also for wisdom (sophia) and not least [of them] the fellow citizens, Larissians, of your companion, Aristippus. The cause of this [happening] to you all is Gorgias. For after coming into the city, he took from the Aleudai lovers both of the foremost kind, [lovers] of wisdom -- among them your lover Aristippus -- and other Thessalians. And in particular, this is the habit to which he has accustomed you all: to answer fearlessly and magnificently whatever anyone would ask, as is fitting of those who know, just as also he offers himself to whoever of the Greeks wishes to ask whatever anyone would wish -- and there is no one he does not answer.

Socrates is not done, but we'll pause here to note the importance of Gorgias. Is Gorgias's influence a good one? Perhaps not, though his reputation as one who answers any question posed to him is demonstrated in Plato's dialogue, Gorgias.